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MONEY, IT'S A CRIME. SHARE IT FAIRLY, BUT DON'T
TAKE A SLICE OF MY PIE!:* THE LEGISLATIVE CASE FOR
THE PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX
Meredith R. Conway**
ABSTRACT
The progressive tax and its soundness as the best tax structure has been the
subject of extensive economic and political debate. A critical void, however, exists
in the scholarship examining proposals in support of or against the progressive tax.
The legislative and political rationales behind the progressive income tax have not
been examined, including the reasons it was enacted and how (and whether) it has
survived through so many administrations and political persuasions. Policymakers
and analysts of the progressive tax cannot appropriately evaluate the consequences
ofa proposal regarding the progressive income tax without this analysis.
The purpose of this article is to identify the rationales for and against the
progressive income tax, both at the time of its enactment and during subsequent
challenges to and affirmations of the progressive income tax. This paper analyzes
six fundamental reasons behind the enactment of the progressive income tax and
their relevancy today. The American public is still supportive of a progressive
income tax and, as a result, when opponents to the progressive income tax make
alternative proposals these opponents often label the proposal or an aspect of the
proposal as progressive to garner public support.
The progressive tax does not exist merely for economic reasons; there are more
economically efficient systems. No matter how economically sound a proposal is,
unless the proposal fulfills the rationales served by a progressive income tax, it will
not be an appropriate replacement. Each of the six reasons, which have been
consistently addressed in legislative history, need to be evaluated before any
discussion surrounding the progressive income tax can take place.
(1) The ability to pay theory provides that those with higher-incomes should
have a higher tax rate and burden because they have extra income (surplus) to fund
the government. Today, however, lower-income taxpayers often pay a greater tax
* Pink Floyd, "Money" from the Dark Side of the Moon (Harvest/Capital Records) (1973).
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rate than wealthy high-income taxpayers. For example, President Obama pays a
lower rate of tax than his secretary and Warren Buffett pays a lower rate of tax
than his secretary. In addition, one of the major arguments in the Occupy
Movement's protests is that currently the tax burden is unfairly placed on the
"99%" of the population whereas taxpayers in the highest "1%" of income share a
lower tax burden.
(2) Enacting a progressive income tax preserves democracy. Today many
argue that democracy has been threatened by the concentration of wealth in a few
through the use ofsuperpacs, wealthy individuals and corporations who are able to
dominate the political discourse through influence, ads, and power.
(3) The progressive tax was enacted to appease labor groups and populists to
prevent socialism, communism, or revolution. Recently the protests from the
Occupy Movement have clearly illustrated that the lack of the progressive tax is
threatening the stability of our government.
(4) The benefit theory states that the taxpayers who benefit the most from
government services should bear the greatest burden to fund the government. The
wealthiest and the poorest receive the most in benefits from the government, while
the heaviest tax burden falls on the middle class.
(5) One argument is that a truly progressive tax has not really been enacted,
rather the appearance of a progressive tax is used to pacify the general public. The
illusion ofa progressive tax serves to appease the public while the tax system really
benefits high-income taxpayers and special interest groups. Recent polls show the
illusion may be wearing thin because a majority ofAmericans think that the income
tax actually benefits the wealthy.
(6) The progressive income tax can be used to redistribute income or wealth.
Today, the disparity and inequality of income and wealth is at its greatest levels
since the Great Depression.
This article identifies these six rationales, examines the entire legislative
history of the progressive income tax, establishes that these rationales are firmly
entrenched, and creates a foundation on which legislators, analysts, and
policymakers can finally base their analysis and proposals.
I. INTRODUCTION
History often repeats itself. "A page of history is worth a volume of logic."'
The wisdom of whether or not the United States should have a progressive
income tax is continually analyzed and scrutinized. Political candidates,
economists, legal academics, political science academics, tax theorists, the media,
commentators, and the general public endlessly debate and examine the progressive
1. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
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income tax and alternatives; however, this discourse is missing an essential
component. The critical information missing from all of these critiques and
proposals is what the foundational reasons were for enacting and maintaining the
progressive income tax throughout history. It is impossible to find a solution to a
problem if the problem has not been identified. The progressive income tax has
enjoyed stability as a concept, and the public, who in general support a progressive
income tax, continue to be under the assumption that the tax code is truly
progressive. The purpose of this article is to identify the rationales for the
progressive income tax, both the enactment and the subsequent challenges against
or affirmations for it, as a policy. This article will define and analyze the six
rationales within the context of the legislative history. This will allow proponents of
the progressive income tax or alternative proposals to address the underlying
reasons for the tax. There are intrinsic justifications behind the congressional and
the executive branch support for the progressive income tax, which are critical to
understanding the tax itself. Therefore, any remedies or counter-proposals to the
progressive income tax need to address these underlying issues for the proposals to
be effective.
Current scholarship on the progressive income tax (and the copious alternative
proposals) is profoundly lacking because the analysis is missing the essential
rationales from the legislative history of the tax and its evolution. To adequately
evaluate the progressive income tax, critics must understand the original
justifications and reasoning for enacting and preserving the tax as well as the
legislative arguments and considerations for later revisions, including any
opposition and challenges lawmakers have made. Because of the void of
scholarship on the legislative history of the progressive income tax, commentators
and scholars examining the progressive income tax have circumvented the
underlying rationales for the tax by completely avoiding it or by making
assumptions upon which to base their theories. The lack of a complete analysis of
the legislative history that lays out the principal reasons for the progressive income
tax results in scholars and commentators merely speculating on the motives of the
legislature or completely ignoring the motives altogether. The history, however, is
there.
After reviewing the legislative record, congressional testimony, hearings,
debates and speeches, the reasons for the enactment, preservation and scrutiny of
the progressive income tax are clear. The analysis of the legislative history of the
tax is at times surprising. The research reveals that often the motives of Congress
and the Executive branch differ and change, as do political persuasions, powerful
interests, and economic conditions. But this history is invaluable to the debate over
the progressive income tax. Not only are economic conditions today reminiscent of
periods within the legislative history of the progressive income tax, but by using the
legislative history as a reference, scholars and current legislators can avoid making
similar misguided proposals or futile arguments. Ultimately, a competent analysis
of the progressive income tax in the United States and its counter proposals requires
an analysis of the underlying legislative reasons and justifications for the original
enactment of the tax.
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This article seeks to establish the rationales behind the progressive income tax
so that they can finally be part of the discourse and thus satisfy the vital need for a
thorough legislative history and analysis of its development. Other scholars have
noted the need to look at the history of the progressive income tax to see if the
historical justifications are still relevant, particularly in light of the fact that we are
facing similar issues with increases in inequality and large concentrations of
wealth.2 As this article reveals, there are some very specific rationales for the
enactment of the progressive income tax, many of which cannot be addressed
merely by economic theories intended to maximize revenue, provisions designed to
appease particular interest groups, or engaging in class warfare. Depending on
which principle behind the progressive income tax is being evaluated, economics,
politics or interest groups may be insufficient to address the issue.
This article is not intended to engage in the progressive income tax debate from
the perspective of economics or new political theories; it is designed to analyze the
legal history of the development of the progressive income tax law and analyze the
legislative premises behind the income tax structure.' This study of the legislative
history of the progressive income tax is particularly important because tax theorists
"fail to use the legislative record to evaluate norms such as progressivity, equality
and efficiency."4 As the discourse and debate of the progressive income tax
continues, analysts will no longer have to make assumptions or guesses as to the
reasons the tax was enacted, as a result of this research. Legislative history can offer
perspective into the context in which laws are created including the movements and
motivations behind a law. A complete tax legislative history can be used to "set the
subject in a somewhat clearer light and to aid the legislator in constructing a
workable scheme."' In addition, courts often look to legislative history to interpret
statutes.
This article will have six parts including this introduction: Part II will briefly
define and discuss the progressive income tax; Part III will lay out the six
legislative rationales for enacting, maintaining, and revising the progressive income
tax; Part IV will provide the analysis of the legislative history revealing the
development of these rationales; Part V will make some predictions and draw some
2. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Book Review: Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity and Progressive
Taxation, Ill YALE L.J. 1391, 1411 (2002) (book review).
3. For a discussion of the philosophical arguments for and against progressivity there are many articles.
See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987); Walter J. Blum & Harry J. Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1952); see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social
Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987).
4. William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax
Policy, 51 TAX L. REv. 287, 291 (1996).
5. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD, at v (1911).
6. The "plain meaning rule," which provides that courts should only look at legislative history when the
meaning is unclear, has been eroded over time. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REv. 819, 845 (1991) (providing that
committee reports have traditionally been considered the most authoritative source of legislative history); see
id.
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conclusions based on the analysis of the legislative history; and Part VI will briefly
conclude.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE TAx
The progressive income tax is a tax structure where the tax rate increases as an
individual taxpayer's income increases: the higher the taxpayer's income, the
higher the taxpayer's respective tax rate. Alternatively, regressive taxation is when
the tax rate increases when a taxpayer's income decreases, and correspondingly, the
higher the taxpayer's income, the lower the tax rate. Finally, degressive taxation is
when the tax rate is perhaps progressive up to a certain income amount, and then
remains constant beyond that fixed rate.9 Another important tax policy
consideration is neutrality, which provides that "taxes should not influence choices
unless this influence is a part of a deliberate social policy.",o Unless legislators
deliberately want a tax law to impact a certain behavior, tax laws should be neutral
and avoid affecting taxpayer behavior. Therefore, irrespective of whether a
degressive, regressive or progressive tax is enacted, it should be neutral unless the
legislature intends to influence certain behaviors deliberately.
A common misconception must be clarified before the substantive discussion
of the progressive income tax. A progressive income tax does not dictate extremely
high or punitive tax rates on high-income taxpayers. Progressive income taxes
merely mean that the higher a taxpayer's income, the higher percentage tax rate that
taxpayer pays on his income. The amount of the progressivity, meaning the
difference in tax rates from high- to low-income taxpayers, may be small or
dramatic and the tax rates on all taxpayers may be high or low. This is important to
emphasize because a common criticism of the progressive income tax is that one of
the historical legislative intents was to "soak the rich," to take wealth away from the
wealthy, and that any progressive income tax dictates punitively high tax rates. This
article will discuss the legislative arguments regarding wealth redistribution and
punitive rates, but assuming that a progressive income tax necessarily requires high
tax rates is incorrect. For example, as this article is being written, current marginal
income tax rates are progressive, perhaps only slightly progressive, with low overall
rates applicable to all taxpayers. Of course, the progressive income tax could be
used as a tool to distribute income or wealth or to be punitive, but that would be a
deliberate choice and is not an essential component of the progressive tax. In fact,
as the legislative history will demonstrate, even when rates for high-income
taxpayers reached 91%, the effective tax rates (the actual tax rates after deductions)
were so much lower that no rates in the United States have resulted in being
punitive or stunting economic growth.
The theory of a progressive income tax preceded United States' founding, but
the income tax was really still being experimented with in other countries even after
7. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 30.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. WILLIAM S. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, at v (1947).
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the United States was founded. The United States also experimented with several
different types of taxes before including an income tax. In addition, once the
Supreme Court had approved of an income tax, it later had to determine whether it
was constitutional if the income tax was progressive." Ultimately, the Supreme
Court decided a progressive income tax was constitutional and that it was in the
legislature's power to decide what was just and equal in terms of rates.1 The
Supreme Court stated it would only use its judicial power to intervene if a tax was
arbitrary or confiscatory, which would mean the tax would violate the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution.13
The general public of the United States has regularly shown approval for a
progressive income tax, supporting the principle that higher-income taxpayers
should bear a greater tax burden. A recent poll demonstrates that a majority of the
public in the United States are concerned that the increasing division in economic
status between taxpayers is bad for the country. 4 The majority of the public in the
United States also believe that high-income taxpayers are not paying enough in
taxes.' At least 58% of Americans stated that they did not believe that high-income
taxpayers currently bore an appropriate share of the tax burden and were not paying
enough in taxes while 26% of those polled stated high-income taxpayers already
paid an appropriate amount. 6 Even 52% out of those polled who personally
considered themselves "upper middle class" said upper-income Americans did not
pay an appropriate share of taxes and should pay more. 7 Only 10% of the public
who classified themselves as upper middle class thought the amount they paid in
taxes was too much." In addition, 62% of the taxpayers polled who considered
themselves upper middle class said they were more financially secure now than
they were 10 years ago, while less than a majority, 44% of those who identified
themselves as middle class and 29% of the lower class, could say the same.
The results reinforce a tide of recent economic data showing a widening
economic divide. America's middle class has been shrinking in the
stagnant economy, and poverty is now approaching 1960s-level highs,
while wealth concentrates at the top of the economic ladder . .. tensions
between the rich and poor increase and are at their most intense level in
nearly a quarter-century." 20 "About 65 percent of Americans say the gap
11. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
12. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109-110 (1900).
13. See id.







20. Hope Yen, Majority in U.S. Say Rich Pay Too Little in Taxes, MSNBC (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48802418/ns/business-personalfinance/#.UDzDs44dPao; see Parker, supra
note 14.
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between rich and poor has gotten wider in the past decade, while 20
percent believe it has stayed the same . .. Separately, 57 percent say a
widening income gap is a bad thing for society; just 3 percent say it is a
good thing.2
As described in greater detail in this article, during our legislative history,
Congress and the Executive Branch, including the Treasury Department,
determined that the federal government had to raise revenue to fund the
government. Ultimately, they concluded after much debate and contemplation, that
a progressive income tax should be part of the overall tax plan.
III. LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES OF A PROGRESSIVE TAX
Tax historians have identified three essential elements that must be part of the
commencement of a new tax regime to garner support from the American public
and elicit confidence in the government.2 Successful ventures have "included some
combination of [the following] elements: (1) enhanced progressiveness in rate
structure, (2) allocation of revenues raised by regressive taxes to programs whose
benefits are distributed progressively, and (3) regulation of behavior in ways that
were widely regarded as improving the national well-being."2 3
The analysis of the legislative history behind the progressive income tax has
discovered six primary reasons and rationales behind its enactment: (1) the Ability
to Pay theory, (2) to preserve democracy, (3) to prevent socialism, communism,
anarchy or revolution, (4) the benefit theory, (5) it is the illusion of a progressive
tax to appease the public while doing favors for special interests and (6) using the
progressive income tax to redistribute income or wealth.
A. Ability to Pay
The "Ability to Pay" Theory is the most often cited justification and legislative
rationale for the progressive income tax. This theory contends that taxpayers should
24
contribute to the government in proportion to their ability, to pay. Taxpayers must
first use their income to pay for necessities. After a taxpayer has paid for his
necessities, additional income is excess or surplus to spend at his whim. As the
taxpayer's surplus income increases, his tax rate should increase so that he bears a
greater burden of the income tax.2 This serves to support the federal government
and raise the necessary revenue without placing too high of a tax burden on lower-
income taxpayers by forcing them to cut out necessities. It is better to take surplus
2 1. Id.
22. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 245 (2d ed. 2004).
23. Id.
24. See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 205 (1909)
[hereinafter SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION].
25. See Jason Bordoff & Jason Furman, Progressive Tax Reform in the Era of Globalization: Building
Consensus for More Broadly Shared Prosperity, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 327, 333 (2008).
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money from the high-income taxpayer than to take money needed for necessities
from the lower-income taxpayer.
Another position that has been used to support this theory is the concept of
26
declining marginal utility of income. Income declines in marginal utility, meaning
21
the more income a taxpayer has, the less value each additional dollar has to him.
For example, $1,000 has much more value to someone living in poverty than to a
multi-billionaire. Therefore, applying a higher marginal tax rate on that $1,000 for
the high-income taxpayer is appropriate because the tax burden will not nearly be as
painful as it would be to the lower-income taxpayer if a tax rate were applied to his
$1,000.
An argument against the ability to pay theory is that even if taxpayers are at the
same income level, the particular needs and wants of an individual, and what is
considered a luxury versus a necessity, varies from taxpayer to taxpayer and
depends on individual circumstances.28 For example, one commentator stated
"[s]ome have taken refuge in the phrase 'ability to pay' but unless ability to pay
turns out to mean just about what the user wants it to mean; so that as a tool for
determining the progressiveness of a graduation it is useless."29 It is all subjective.
Another criticism of the ability to pay theory is at what income level progressivity
and the ability to pay tax rate increases stop. Certain taxpayers earn so much
income that it is more than they could spend in a lifetime. If the United States
enacted a progressive income tax system that continually increased in progression
as income levels rose, at a certain income level it would begin to tax all of the
taxpayer's excess income, essentially confiscating all of the excess income.3 A tax
that would confiscate all income would be unconstitutional in the United States.
The ability to pay theory has been represented consistently throughout the
legislative history of the progressive income tax code, as will be reflected by the
historical analysis to follow. The ability to pay theory was actually used to justify
32
progressivity in the Colonial Period. There was a tax in the Massachusetts Bay,
which taxed each man "according to his estate and with consideration of all other
abilities whatsoever."33 It was a property tax, not an income tax, but it was based on
the principle that those with more wealth and prosperity had a greater ability to pay
26. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 3, at 1947.
27. See id. One only needs to see some of the bar tabs on the Rich Kids of Instagram and compare it to
the total income of a middle-income taxpayer to demonstrate and validate the theory of the declining marginal
utility of income. See RICH KIDS OF INSTAGRAM,
http://richkidsofinstagram.tumblr.com/post/29351797304/100k (showing a receipt (proudly uploaded and
posted) for a bar tab over C107,000). Meanwhile, according to the 2010 census bureau, the median income
was $50,046, less than half of the bar tab. See Amanda Noss, Household Income for States: 2009 and 2010,
UNITED STATE CENSUS BUREAU 2 (Sept. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/201 1pubs/acsbrl0-02.pdf. What
would have happened if those kids had decided to stay in for the night?
28. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 210.
29. VICKREY, supra note 10, at 375.
30. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 213.
31. See John Douglas Messina v. United States, 202 Ct. Cl. 155, 160-61 (1973) (citing Brushaber v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916)).
32. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 368 (citing Colonial Records of Massachusetts Bay (Shurtleff's ed.
1853), 1, at 180).
33. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 368.
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and should bear a greater burden.3 4 During the American Revolution, those with
greater wealth carried a greater burden of the taxes to fund the government through
the property taxes.35 The larger a taxpayer's property, the greater his perceived
wealth, and thus, the greater his ability to bear the burden of the tax.
The ability to pay rationale for the progressive income tax began with the first
income tax. In 1862, Representative Morill, who was subsequently appointed
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, was not an enthusiastic supporter of
an income tax. However, after concluding that an income tax was needed, he further
concluded that the tax should not equally impact everyone, but instead should be
"proportionate to his ability to pay."" He argued that it was only fair for men "with
large incomes, to pay more in proportion to what they have than those with limited
means."38
B. To Preserve Democracy
A particular legislative concern when enacting the progressive income tax was
to champion and safeguard democracy. Some legislators were proponents of the
progressive income tax because in their view it was consistent with democracy, the
right thing to do. For example, in 1909 Senator William Borah argued, "I do not
believe that the great framers of the Constitution, the men who were framing a
government for the people, of the people and by the people, intended that all the
taxes of this government should be placed upon the backs of those who toil, upon
consumption. . . This cannot be true; it was never so intended; it was a republic
they were building, where all men were to be equal and bear equally the burdens of
government, and not an oligarchy.""
As the thorough discussion of legislative history in Part IV will reveal, a steady
and unfailing consideration throughout the years and woven throughout the debate
of the progressive income tax was to preserve and protect democracy. Of particular
concern was the concentration of wealth and income was one of the biggest current
threats to democracy, as alluded to above when Senator Borah cites the threat of a
potential oligarchy. Certain legislators warned that allowing too much income and
wealth to accumulate in the hands of a few would shift the balance of power. There
was a very real risk that those with power could exert strong influence over the
legislative process if their incomes and wealth grew to sufficient levels. It would
allow a powerful few not only the ability to influence politicians, but to essentially
buy political offices. The danger is that the high-income levels and wealth will




35. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 19.
36. See Bordoff & Furman, supra note 25, at 331-332; see BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 19.
37. STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN -TEDDY ROOSEVELT - WILSON How THE
INCOME TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICA 39 (2002).
38. Id.
39. 44 CONG. REC. 1701 (1909) (statement of Sen. Borah).
40. See Bordoff & Furman, supra note 25, at 328.
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In addition to the risk of overly influential taxpayers, if too much income is
concentrated among high-income taxpayers, there is also the risk of upheaval and
rebellion from lower -income taxpayers. Some legislators expressed concern that
the growing economic disparity would cause lower -income taxpayers to protest
and dissent, and sometimes the word revolution was used. If income inequality is
permitted to increase, at a certain point the lower -income taxpayers could revolt
against capitalism, threatening democracy.4
A recent example of the threat economic inequality poses to democracy and the
stability of government and our civilized society is the Occupy Movement protests.
This civil unrest was exactly what legislators throughout the legislative history
sought to mitigate or eliminate. History does repeat itself and legislators envisioned
a similar schism developing at the beginning of the last century, by contemplating
that economic inequality posed a threat to democracy. To assuage the threat,
legislators enacted progressive taxes theorizing that a progressive income tax might
quell such dissent.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted, "income inequality is where
the capitalist system is most vulnerable."42 In addition, Aristotle warned that once
the middle class erodes and income inequality becomes so great that the poor
outnumber the wealthy "the state soon comes to an end."43 Aware of these threats to
democracy and capitalism, legislators have often argued to maintain some degree of
progressivity in the tax code to protect democracy, although the constant increase in
income and wealth disparity continues to pose a threat. Using the progressive
income tax as a means to alleviate income inequality is another rationale for the
progressive income tax addressed below. In the context of preserving democracy,
however, legislators were not always concerned about the disparity per se but rather
ensuring that the disparity, or the perception of the disparity, did not threaten the
democracy of the United States. As a result, the progressive income tax was often
seen as a tool to be used when the public would begin to object to the growing
economic disparity.
In 2007, the Director of the Tax Policy Center warned in his testimony before
the House Appropriations Committee that "[g]rowing inequality can lead to a
populist revolt against factors thought to be implicated, such as free trade and
relatively unfettered markets. Increasing trade barriers and increased regulation
could diminish the incomes of those at the top by much more than a modestly
progressive tax system (and might not help those at the bottom either). The
progressive income tax might be viewed as a mechanism to buy the support of
ordinary working people for a system that disproportionately benefits a few high
earners." He counseled that if legislators were concerned about preserving the
41. See id.
42. Martin Crutsinger, Greenspan Talk Doesn't Roil Markets, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (March 13,
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/13.AR2007031300744.html.
43. Bordoff & Furman, supra note 25, at 332 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLIiCS 94 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
2004)).
44. Tax Fairness: Policy and Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov't
of the H. Appropriations Comm., Il0th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Director, Tax
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high-income levels of their high-income taxpayer constituents then they should
support a higher marginal tax rate on that income. He stated that the risk of a
populist revolt which could interfere with free trade, limited regulations, capitalism
and democracy, posed a greater danger to high incomes than the threat of high
taxes.45 The premise he advocated was that a progressive income tax with higher
marginal rates on high-income taxpayers would appease the ordinary people, in turn
supporting the stability of democracy, and the favorable economic conditions
46
permitting high-income taxpayers to maintain their levels of income. He also
reported that higher marginal tax rates would be effective at quelling a populist
rebellion, even if the ordinary workers did not actually benefit from the more
progressive income tax because of the perception that higher-income taxpayers
were bearing a greater tax burden.47
To avoid both of these possible threats and disruptions to democracy, the threat
of an oligarchy or plutocracy and the threat of a populist revolt, legislators routinely
advocated for the progressive income tax to both appease the lower-income
taxpayers and to ensure that democracy would not be threatened by too much
wealth and income in the hands of the few.
C. To Prevent Socialism, Communism, Anarchy or Revolution
Very often in the history of the progressive income tax, when a proponent of
the progressive income tax suggests increasing tax rates, political pundits slap the
label "socialist" on the proposal, as a means to draw opposition to it or to connect it
with negative connotations.4 8 President Barack Obama recently poked fun at this
trend by relaying a story, described in greater detail below in the analysis of the
legislative history in Part IV, about how a former president spoke about fairness
when he discovered that he paid lower tax rates than his secretary, concluding,
"[t]hat wild-eyed socialist, tax-hiking class warrior was Ronald Reagan." Even
Thomas Paine, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, who was not a
41
socialist, was an advocate for progressive tax.
Ironically, part of the reason the progressive income tax was enacted and why it
survived during some of most contentious periods with socialism and communism





48. See, e.g, Associated Press, Is Obama a Socialist, CNBC (June 4, 2012),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47678760/IsObama aSocialist (discussing the various claims that President
Obama is a socialist including dissents from the Socialist Party claiming that if Obama was a socialist he
would be a very bad one); see also SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 141; Michael
Tackett, Here Reagan's Compromise Would Collide with Tea Party Certitude, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-28/hero-reagan-s-compromise-would-collide-with-tea-party-
certitude.html (pointing out that under the definition conservatives apply today when labeling someone a
socialist, President Ronald Reagan would be a socialist).
49. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 133.
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in American history was actually to thwart this very threat." This was the most
evident during the 1920s under Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon when most
analysts would have expected the progressive income tax to be repealed.
Furthermore, as the legislative history will illustrate, the story President Obama told
about President Reagan was true (although he was not a socialist). He did, however,
continue a progressive income tax after evaluating other alternatives and because of
a combination of reasons, including not wanting to alienate the lower-income
taxpayers.
It may be cynical, but this explanation does finally illuminate why a group of
wealthy taxpayers deliberately imposed a higher tax burden upon themselves. Some
lawmakers may simply have been fair and good people choosing to share a larger
part of the burden. But for the more skeptical observer, perhaps these lawmakers
felt what was at risk if they did not impose and maintain the progressive income tax
was too great. Labor groups had become more powerful, landowners had combined
forces with the Populist Party to oppose the tariffs and property tax structures, and
those in power became vulnerable to the threat of socialism and communism.
As the legislative history will demonstrate, to silence and undermine the
opponents to capitalism and democracy, the legislature gave the vocal populist
movement the progressive income tax they had asked for. Although it increased the
tax burden for the wealthy, it was certainly less problematic than what would have
been lost by not acting and empowering the socialists, communists and anarchists
with the existing regressive tax system. "Above all, many proponents of the income
tax saw it as a safety valve; a way of placating the restive lower classes who might
otherwise be alienated from American society.""
D. Using the Progressive Tax to Redistribute Wealth and Income
Henry Simons, a famous economist wrote, "The case for drastic progressive
taxation must be rested on the case against inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic
judgment that the prevailing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree
(and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely."52 He was basically
saying that you will never find an economic argument to justify a progressive
income tax, it will always ultimately have to rest on whatever level of unfairness
and inequality society in the United States is willing to tolerate.
As further evidence that the public supports the idea of mitigating some degree
of income inequality, Professor Daniel Shaviro responded in testimony before the
House Committee on Finance that if the sole purpose behind the federal income tax
was to raise revenue and we did:
50. See Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist -Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate
Reduction for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REv. 905, 912 (1996).
51. wEISMAN, supra note 37, at 138.
52. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM IN
FISCAL POLICY 18 (1938).
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[N]ot care at all about the distribution of wealth-the obvious thing to do
would be to have a uniform head tax in which every American, be it Bill
Gates or a homeless person, pays exactly the same amount. No one
agrees to that. So at this point, we are really talking in matters of degree,
where really the question is-the phrase that is often used is the ability to
pay, how well-off one individual is, how able to contribute to the cost of
government, compared to another person.
There will always be income inequality and different degrees of wealth, but a
progressive income tax can be used to mitigate some degree of that inequality.
Opponents of progressive income tax often contend that the intent behind
progressive tax rates is to merely take income away from one taxpayer and give it
to another to make everyone equal. For example, Senator Grassley addressed using
the progressive income tax to redistribute income in his opening statement before
the Senate Finance Committee Hearing last year. He said:
It is clear that some people believe that the tax code should be used to reduce
the growing income disparity between lowest and highest income quintiles. This
assumes a key objective of the Federal Government through the Federal income tax
laws should be to ensure that income is distributed equally throughout the
citizenry.54
Progressive tax rates cannot and should not attempt to equalize income after
taxes. The goal of progressive income taxes is to ensure that the federal government
is funded and that the burden of funding the government falls on taxpayers that
have more disposable income.s
Part of the legislative history of this rationale as described below will
demonstrate that some legislators had the viewpoint that the extremely wealthy,
such as the Vanderbilts and Astors, had become wealthy on the backs of the
common man; that no amount of intellect or work could justify the vast amounts of
income and, therefore, it had been earned by exploiting other men. As a result,
these legislators would seek to impose redistributive provisions to remedy the
injustice. For example, in 1913 Congressman Copley introduced a progressive
income tax because he believed that it was:
[T]he best way of equalizing the opportunities which society in this
country offers to certain men in securing more than their fair share of the
benefits derived from the labors of other men. If there is one tax which
53. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 112th Cong. 21 (2011) (statement of Professor Daniel Shaviro).
54. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 112th Cong. 18 (2011) (statement of Senator Grassley).
55. Professors Hall and Rabusjka, in their proposal for a flat tax stated "Despite attempts to equalize
after-tax incomes through steeply graduated rates." ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSJKA, THE FLAT TAx 43
(2d ed. 1995). However, there does not appear to be any legislative history or initiatives to try to equalize
incomes in the United States, which is different than applying a different tax burden to those with a higher
ability to pay and also different from using the tax code to reduce inequalities. Reducing income inequalities
is different than "equalizing incomes."
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bears lightly on the shoulders of the individual paying it is that which is
16
paid out of a surplus income.
Legislators can also use the progressive income tax and the ability to redistribute
income as a valuable political platform to certain constituents. However, as the
legislative history will reveal, it has not been the reality. Almost all social programs
have been funded by the middle class, such as Social Security and Medicare, or
through the growing use of deficits. Instead, income disparity is growing. Growth in
income has been concentrated at the top and at the same time tax rates have become
less and less progressive." IRS data shows, the richest 400 taxpayers had their
incomes increase from 1992 to 2007 over 400% (from $65 million to $345 million)
while, at the same time, their effective tax rates dropped from 25% to 16.6%, while
most middle income families saw almost no increase in their income levels." Long-
term capital gains accounted for 62.7% of the income for these top 400 taxpayers.s"
So, as much as legislators and politicians, such as Senator Grassley, bemoan the
redistribution of wealth or income through the progressive income tax, it is all talk.
There is no redistribution; it is merely political pandering to different interest
groups.
The biggest argument, however, addressing whether there is any truth behind
the rationale that a progressive income tax can lead to greater income and wealth
equality, or inequality, is the recent evidence presented as a result of the Bush tax
cuts in 2001 and 2003. President Bush dramatically reduced the progressivity of the
tax code. Several economists and commentators warned that the impact on income
tax progressivity would result in a growth in income inequality. The benefits from
the reduction in the capital gains rates are exceedingly concentrated with the
highest income taxpayers. Over 90 percent of long-term capital gains were
recognized by only 20 percent of the highest-income taxpayers. As the
conclusions begin to emerge, it appears that the theory is in fact valid: progressive
income taxes, or in this case, the lack or elimination of progressive income taxes,
61
can greatly affect the amount of income or wealth disparity.
E. We Do Not Really Have a Progressive Tax,
Just the Appearance of One to Appease the Public
Some have argued that the highest marginal rates are merely symbolic to make
the general public believe "erroneously, that the tax system was steeply progressive,
56. 50 CONG. REC. H. 1246 (1913) (statement of Representative Copley).
57. See Bordoff & Furman, supra note 25, at 328.
58. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the S Comm. on
Fin., 112th Cong. 138 (2011) (Appendix, Question from Senator Menendez).
59. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the S Comm. on
Fin., 112th Cong. 138 (2011) (Appendix, Reynolds response to Question from Senator Menendez).
60. See Hearing on Tax Reform and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, Joint Hearing between the Sen.
Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee (2012) (statement of Professor Leonard Burman
5) available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/09201220Burman2OTestimony.pdf
61. See infra pp. 46-48.
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and that the truly rich were paying most of their income to the government."
When the highest rate of 91% was applicable, it was so limited it did not serve
much purpose other than to appease the public.63 It made the average citizen feel
better about his own tax burden when he thought at least others were paying more.
In addition, as current legislative history will demonstrate, we currently do not
have a very progressive income tax. And when employment taxes are added into
the equation we have a combination of a regressive and a degressive tax. Since the
Bush tax cuts and the reduction of the capital gains rates, the burden of the income
tax is no longer progressively on the shoulders of the wealthy. For example as
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee Senator Baucus said at a joint hearing
with the House Ways and Means Committee (one of the first such joint meetings in
over 70 years) "low capital gains rates are the main reason many wealthy
individuals pay lower tax rates than middle class families."" In the same hearing,
Ranking Member of the House Ways and Means Committee, Congressman Levin
noted that 71 percent of the benefits of the reduced capital gains rates goes to
individuals making over $1 million a year and noted that it affects the progressivity
65
of our tax system.
Finally, the legislative history will repeatedly demonstrate that legislators often
prefer a steeply progressive income tax, not because they actually want higher-
income taxpayers to bear a higher burden of the tax, but because it serves several
political purposes. It allows them to appear sympathetic and responsive to their
low-income constituents. At the same time, by having high-income tax rates they
have the ability to create special loopholes, deductions, and tax expenditures for
special interest groups and supporters. Because these tax benefits are masked by the
higher tax rates, they are often invisible and therefore go unnoticed, allowing
legislators free reign to grant political favors. The result is that the tax code
becomes complicated and is so riddled with cuts and exclusions that the high
marginal tax rates bear little resemblance to the effective tax rate, the tax rate the
taxpayer actually pays.
F. The Benefit Theory
The final rationale to the enactment of the progressive income tax is the benefit
66
theory. The benefit theory dictates that taxes should be paid in proportion to the
62. Edward J. McCaffery, The UCLA Tax Policy Conference: Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REv. 1861, 1892 (1994).
63. See id. (Professor McCaffery cites studies that hold that citizens equate the highest rate with the most
just or appropriate rate).
64. See Hearing on Tax Reform and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, Joint Hearing between the Sen.
Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee (2012) (testimony of Senator Baucus- minute
marker 32.26 http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearingl?id=a8c63df9-5056-a032-5299-2e87363627af
65. See Hearing on Tax Reform and Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, Joint Hearing between the Sen.
Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee (2012) (testimony of Senator Baucus- minute
marker 37.38 http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=a8c63df9-5056-a032-5299-2e87363627af
66. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 150.
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benefits received from the government." Although an argument can be made under
the benefit theory for the progressive income tax, and it was at one time used as a
justification for the progressive income tax, today, the benefit theory is used more
often to oppose the progressive income tax.
To give an example of using the benefit theory to support the progressive
income tax, in 1913 to support the introduction of a progressive income tax, one
Congressman argued that John D. Rockefeller should bear a higher tax burden
under the benefit theory because:
He could not possibly have created this wealth by the labor of his own
hand or brain alone. It required, in addition the conditions of society[,]
which allowed him private ownership of oil lands and oil wells, which
allowed him practically whatever margin he could get on refining his
product and also whatever margin for distribution he might take.
A benefit argument today in support of the progressive income tax might argue that
high-income taxpayers benefit from the tax treaties the United States government
enters into, the military, the police force to protect their property, a sound financial
system with which to hold their money, the SEC to help regulate their investments,
roads that their business trucks have to drive on, public works departments that
maintain their neighborhoods, even the Army Corps of Engineers repairing beach
erosion to protect their summer homes. Governments are there for protection and
order, and the wealthy have more to protect.
Alternatively, the benefit theory can also be used to argue that the income tax
should be regressive, not progressive, by arguing that lower-income taxpayers use
more of the public goods provided by the government. The wealthy can use private
schools and security teams. Low-income taxpayers use the public school system
more often, need student loans, the public transit infrastructure, Medicaid, welfare,
unemployment, social services, and so on. Many have argued that there is no way to
accurately calculate the cost/benefit analysis under the benefit theory. Moreover,
adding to the complexity, two taxpayers earning similar amounts may "benefit"
from the tax system differently-for example, one may have several children and
one may not. Taxing them differently as a result of the different benefits they
receive would not only be an administrative nightmare but could violate horizontal
equity. While the amount of benefits received and their value is impossible to
determine, it is also unrealistic to rely on.
67. See id. Both Hobbes and Adam Smith were proponents of the Benefit Theory. See id. at 158, 164.
However, Adam Smith stated that taxpayers should contribute to the government to support its activities in
proportion to each taxpayers ability to pay, and that this ability to pay was a reflection of the protection
provided by that very government. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 414 (Methuen & Co. Ltd.1904)
(1776).
68. 50 CONG. REc. H. 1246 (1913) (statement of Congressman Copley).
69. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 243.
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IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. Ancient History
In the Middle Ages, taxes were direct taxes, usually on trade or transportation.o
There was, at times, the pretense of progressive direct taxes (not income taxes);
however, it appears that the taxes were actually regressive and placed a higher
burden on the poor rather than the wealthy." The earliest record of a progressive tax
is in Athens 596 B.C. and it was on the produce from land-presumably the greater
the amount of produce, the higher the tax rate.72 In the 18th and 19th centuries,
England had property, customs, and excise taxes." England imposed an income tax,
although not progressive, in 1799 as a temporary emergency measure then enacted
the income tax of 1842, which continued for at least a century. In comparison, the
first income tax in the United States was enacted during the Civil War in 1862 and,
therefore, was not that far removed from the enactment in England. Progressive
income taxes were added in England in 1910 to increase revenue and to make the
wealthier classes feel more invested in the social reform targeting lower-income
people.
The lack of progressive taxation was one of the leading grievances motivating
the French Revolution, between 1789-1799, because of the perceived economic
inequality among the classes. Although there were several efforts to create a
progressive tax system, ultimately, the French revolution did not result in a
progressive tax system.7 France finally adopted a progressive system in the early
78
20th century. In 1887, Germany instituted progressive indirect taxes, which were
designed to protect smaller producers from larger competitors. 9
By 1908, almost all countries had adopted a progressive "principle" to their
system of taxation, although few had adopted a progressive income tax, and for the
few that had, progressivity was a small feature of a larger overall taxing system.o
An international movement had begun to transition to income taxes from the prior
systems of tariffs, excise, or property taxes." Throughout the world, "[a]mid the
clashing of divergent interests and the endeavor of each social class to roll off the
70. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 41.
71. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 14-15.
72. See id. at 11.
73. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 57.
74. See VICKREY, supra note 10, at 329.
75. See The Finance Act, 1909-10, 10 Edw. 7, c.8, §§65-72 (Eng.); SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 207.
76. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 30.
77. See id. at 36-37.
78. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 326.
79. See id. at 57.
80. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION supra note 24, at 1 (citing as examples monarchies such as
continental Europe and Japan, and also democracies such as America, Australia, Germany, Austria, Sweden,
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Canada and Switzerland).
81. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 4.
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burden of taxation on some other class ... the history of finance, in other words,
shows the evolution of the principle of faculty or ability to pay."82
B. The Beginning of Taxation in the United States
Before the adoption of a progressive income tax, taxes in the United States
were typically excise, custom, or property taxes. The excise taxes, also known as
consumption taxes, were regressive in nature and were preferred by Republicans.
The excise taxes imposed higher tax rates on lower-income taxpayers than on
higher-income taxpayers. Excise taxes were imposed on essentially every
consumer good." Before the federal tax was declared unconstitutional, variations of
progressive taxes had been instituted in six different ways." They included a house
tax, an income tax (during the civil war), a business tax, a corporate tax, an
inheritance tax, and a land tax." The federal government was experimenting with
the idea of progressivity, but had not yet committed to it with any substantial or
meaningful tax.
C. The Civil War and the Beginning of the Income Tax
The first federal income tax was enacted temporarily to fund the Civil War.
The traditional federal tax structure of excise and custom taxes placed a greater
burden on lower-income taxpayers and was not sufficient to fund the war effort. In
addition, because these taxes were regressive, Republican leaders became
concerned that the higher tax burden on lower-income taxpayers was undermining
confidence in the Republican Party and the war effort.90 The Republican Party set
out to engage lower-income taxpayers and to mend any alienation. They began to
evaluate tax systems that reflected a closer relationship to a taxpayer's ability to
91
pay.
Originally the Secretary of the Treasury suggested a property tax, but the
Western States objected. They argued that a property tax would unfairly fall
disproportionately on the Western States because they had a larger land base and
the proposed tax would exclude the income and wealth held in personal property
such as real estate improvements, stocks, bonds and cash, allowing wealthy
92
taxpayers who held their income outside of real estate to escape taxation.
Congressman Colfax from Indiana, for example, stated, "I cannot go home and tell
82. Id.
83. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 32; Sharon C. Nantell, Symposium: Federal Tax Policy in the New
Millennium: A Cultural Perspective, 2 CHAP. L. REv. 33, 41 (1999).
84. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 32.
85. See id.
86. See SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, supra note 24, at 101.
87. See id.
88. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 494 (Touchstone) (3d ed. 2005).
89. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 32.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 33.
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my constituents that I voted for a bill that would allow a man, a millionaire, who
has put his entire property into stock, to be exempt from taxation, while a farmer
who lives by his side must pay a tax."93
By the time of the Civil War, not only was there a desperate need for revenue
but the composition of the wealth in the United States had also changed. Wealth
was evolving from the traditional farmers and plantation owners, whose wealth was
held in real property, to industrialists, bankers, businessmen, and merchants; people
who held their wealth in stocks and bonds and lived in cities.9 4 With these three new
considerations: the burden on the lower-income taxpayer, the desperate need for
revenue, and the changing composition of wealth, the House Ways and Means
Committee considered several ways to raise the revenue.95 A number of
Congressmen wanted to continue to raise revenues by increasing tariffs. Initially,
the Committee considered increasing the tariffs; it became clear, however, that it
was going to be too high of a burden on the poor. Then the Ways and Means
97
Committee considered a tax on real estate. The property tax, however, could not
raise sufficient revenues because many of the large land area states were in the
Confederacy, and the tax did not reach the wealth of the highest income taxpayers
in the United States, those who held their wealth and income in salaries, stocks, and
bonds.98 Legislators discussed whether the United States should have a progressive
income tax, including whether it was moral and fair to put the higher tax burden on
the wealthy.
In the debate over the progressive income tax, Congressmen argued that a
progressive tax that increased rates as a taxpayer's income increased was
fundamentally unfair because it penalized taxpayers simply for making more
income. Instead, some argued the tax burden should be shared equally:
This provision flows upon the principle of taxing a man more because he
is richer than another. The very theory of our institutions is entire
equality that we make a distinction between the rich man and the poor
man. . .and I regard it as an evidence of the spirit of agrarianism to
present a law here, which shall make any such distinction. It is seizing
the property of men for the crime of having too much.99
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee Thaddeus Stevens thought it was
unfair and "a punishment of the rich man because he is rich."' t He argued in a
congressional debate, "[i]t seems to me that it is a strange way to punish men
because they are rich... . I think the principle of taxing a man who is worth twenty
93. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., IST SESS. 306 (1861) (statement of Rep. Colfax).
94. See WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 13.
95. See id at 31.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 32.
99. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., IST SESS., 1876 (1864) (statement of Rep. Justin Morrill).
100. See WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 85.
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thousand dollars more in proportion to his wealth is an unjust one."'o'
Representative Morrill, who was also a member of the Ways and Means Committee
and was Chair of the tax writing subcommittee agreed, stating that progressive
income tax rates were "a confiscation of property, because one man happens to
have a little more money than another.,,102 Certain House members were concerned
it would "lead American citizens to expatriate themselves.,
03
However, despite the objections of those Congressmen, the agenda for creating
a progressive income tax during the Civil War was to "create a fair system of
taxation." Member of the House Ways and Means Committee, Thomas Edwards, a
banker himself, stated, "[w]hy should we stickle about terms? Why should we not
impose the burdens which are to fall upon the people of this country equally, in
proportion to their ability to bear them?"l04 Congress felt so strongly about
including an income tax that would reach the highest income taxpayers, that when
they originally received a proposal from the Ways and Means Committee for a
property tax, they sent it back for revision and requested that it include "internal
duties or direct taxation upon personal income or wealth." ' In sending the original
proposal back for revision, Representative Frank declared, "I think it is just, right
and proper that those having a larger amount of income shall pay a larger amount of
tax."
The Ways and Means Committee complied and provided a proposal for a
progressive income tax. In 1862 Congress enacted the first progressive income tax.
As the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service reported in 1864, "[t]he
people of this country have accepted it with cheerfulness, to meet a temporary
exigency, and it has excited no serious complaint."' 7 The tax rate was three percent
on incomes between $600 and $10,000 and was five percent on incomes above
$10,000. 1 In 1864, because of the need to raise additional revenue, rates were
raised and were made more progressive.09 There was a 5% rate on incomes above
$600 and below $5,000, a 7.5% rate on incomes from $5,000 to $10,000 and a ten
percent rate on incomes above $10,000." While the rates are low compared to the
tax rates enacted in later years, the taxes that were paid as a result of the new
progressive income tax were sometimes twice the amount that higher-income
taxpayers had been accustomed to paying under the previous tax structure.1
Secretary of the Treasury Fessenden defended the progressive structure of the
tax in his report stating that increasing tax rates as income levels rise "although
unequal in one sense, can be considered oppressive or unjust, in as much as the
101. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., IST SESS., 1876 (1864) (statement of Chairman Thaddeus Stevens).
102. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 85.
103. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 441.
104. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 33.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id. at 84.
107. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 439.
108. See The Act of 1861, H.R., Pub. No. 40, §§89-93, 12 Stat. 432, 37th Cong., Ist Sess. 473 (1861).
109. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 440.
110. See The Act of 1864, H.R. 405, 38th Cong. H§ 116-123 (1864).
111. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 34.
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ability to pay increases in as much more that arithmetical proportion as the amount
of income exceeds the limit of reasonable necessity."" 2 He was asserting that the
progressive income tax was fair because it correlated to a taxpayer's ability to pay
and a taxpayer's surplus income. Secretary Fessenden added that he agreed with the
progressive income tax because "those having very large incomes can afford, and
perhaps better afford than those who have smaller ones, to pay a tax, and a larger
tax, the discriminating tax if you please.""'
Congress and the political leaders ventured into the world of progressive
income taxes during the Civil War, but tepidly.'14 It would not be until the later
World Wars that progressive income taxes were implemented on a larger, more
permanent scale."' While the progressive income tax was relatively well received
during the Civil War, administrative tools were not yet established (such as
withholding at the employer level) and therefore President Abraham Lincoln's
administration was not able to rely on the progressive income tax as the primary
source of revenue to fund the war effort.' It ultimately funded about twenty
percent of the war's cost."
In the Confederacy, the income tax was used at the state level on primarily the
commercial and professional classes." The main taxes to generate revenues for the
Confederacy were consumption taxes, which were supplemented by a progressive
salaries tax that was later replaced by a proportional tax.119
After the Civil War ended in 1865, the progressive income tax was set to expire
in 1870.12 Representative Morrill, who was now Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, made a report on behalf of the Committee and acknowledged
that the tax had been successful in raising revenue and was also well received by
the public because of its support of the war.12 He also cautioned that before an
income tax could be permanently implemented, many changes would have to be
made.12 The income tax had a publicity requirement; Chairman Morrill noted that
taxpayers did not like to disclose their incomes and predicted that taxpayers would
understate their income.12 Moreover, he continued, because the understatements
would be under oath, it could lead to the corruption of morals. Being deceptive
112. CONG. GLOBE, 64TH CONG., 2D). SESS. HR 20573 (1917). (statement of Sec. of Treasury William
Fessenden).
113. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., IST SESS. 2513 (1864). (statement of Sec. of Treasury William
Fessenden).
114. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 1.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 36.
117. See id
118. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 406; see also WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 66.
119. See Deborah A. Geier, Fundamental Tax Reform: Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and
the Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. REv. 99, 100 (2003).
120. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 449.





would become so commonplace that people would feel imprudent if they chose not
to be deceptive.12
Several senators objected to the elimination of the progressive nature of the tax
noting, "[n]o one of this class has ever sent a request to this Congress to be relieved
from taxation .... On the other hand, we do have petitions from struggling
manufacturers coming to us from all quarters of the land, asking for relief."'25 Other
senators asked for even more progressive rates, to which Chairman Morrill strongly
objected. 12 At one point, Chairman Morrill even referred to progressivity as
"highway robbery" when debating the ability to pay as a justification for a more
progressive system.127
Following the Congressional debates, a continuation of some progressivity in
the income tax was maintained. 12 There was a five percent rate on income in excess
of $600 and a ten percent rate on income over $5,000.129 The firm expiration date of
1870 remained.' In 1867, however, a mere one year after the supporters of the
progressive income tax had won an extension following the Civil War, Congress
decided to abandon the progressivity of the tax and instead imposed a flat five
percent on all incomes over $ 1,000. "' It still had an aspect of progressivity to it and
was consistent with the ability to pay theory because it applied only to incomes
above $1,000, the amount Congress concluded would "exempt so much of one's
income as was demanded by his actual necessities."13 2 This flat rate income tax
continued until the income tax's expiration in 1870.
D. After Civil War until the Passage of the 16t Amendment -
The Fear of Socialism
After the Civil War, the previous system of high excise taxes was eliminated
along with the income tax. Wealthy taxpayers complained that the high cost of
living made the excise taxes too much of a burden. The Republicans did,
however, keep the high tariffs and other consumption taxes, even though they were
regressive and placed a higher tax burden on lower-income taxpayers.134 In the late
1800s and early 1900s legislators began to debate whether taxes that were
regressive in nature, such as the consumption tax, were fair and economically
feasible. This began a discourse about replacing regressive taxes with an income tax
to more fairly allocate the tax burden.' Most of the discussion focused on ensuring
124. See id.
125. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 2783 (1866) (statement of Sen. Frederick Pike).
126. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 451.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 453-54.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See ACT OF MARCH 2, 1867, H.R. 1161, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 39TH CONG. 2D SESS. 477-78 (1867).
132. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 453.
133. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 33-34.
134. See Nantell, supra note 80, at 41; see BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 34.
135. See Geier, supra note 117, at 100; see generally Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth
Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARtZ. ST. L.J. 1057 (2001).
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that there was an appropriate tax burden on the various income levels. Despite the
discussions, from 1872 until 1911, tariffs continued to be the main source of federal
revenues. The income tax, however, had not been forgotten and was reintroduced
at least sixty-six times in Congress.137
Although an actual progressive income tax had not been enacted, the discourse
signified that lawmakers recognized the unequal burden imposed by consumption
taxes. Even when a tax is equally applied to economic classes on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, because of the declining marginal utility of income, the value of that dollar
had a higher value in the hands of a lower-income taxpayer than a higher-income
taxpayer. For example, Senator John Sherman, in advocating to move from
consumption taxes to an income tax, said, "[t]he consumption of the rich does not
bear the same relation to the consumption of the poor as the income of the one does
to the wages of the other."' Legislators were clearly beginning to evaluate whether
a tax was equitable based on the impact it had on economic classes rather than just
on a numerical flat amount.
The desire to move to an income tax where the burden would be on higher-
income taxpayers from a consumption tax, which placed the tax burden on low-
income taxpayers, was intensifying. Senator Henry M. Teller advocated for an
income tax noting that "[t]he man who holds millions of dollars worth of property
pays no more, perhaps under the general taxes levied upon consumption than the
man who has not any property. "39 "Expenditure becomes an unsatisfactory test of
ability to pay, not only because it puts a premium on the penurious rich man, but
because it imposes a crushing burden on the average poor man."' 40
A substantial part of the growing awareness of inequity of the tax burdens and
the discussion of alternative proposals was fueled by the expanding influence of the
socialist movement. Much of the debate was the result of demands for a progressive
income tax from the Socialist Party and farmers groups.14' The farmers groups later
consolidated into the Populist Party.142 The Socialist Party, the farmers groups, and
the Populist Party had been advocating for a progressive income tax; however, their
appeals for tax revision had largely been ignored.143 For several years, a progressive
income tax was "one of the chief planks in the platform" for all of these groups,
creating a unifying cause.144 Their calls for a progressive income tax also went
unnoticed by the public through the 1880s because of a period of prosperity.
Politicians and lawmakers were not entirely blind to the dangers that the growing
136. See Nantell, supra note 80, at 40-41; see BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 37 (excluding a few years of
severe depression and during the Spanish-American War when federal revenues from taxes on alcohol and
tobacco exceeded the revenue raised from the tariffs); see id. at 37-38.
137. See WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 132.
138. Jensen, supra note 133, at 1094 (quoting JOHN SHERMAN, SELECTED SPEECHES ON FINANCE AND
TAXATION, FROM 1859-1878, at 336, 348-49 (1879).
139. 26 CONG. REc. 6692 (1894) (statement of Sen. Teller).
140. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 12.







socialist movement and communism posed to the democracy of the United States.
President Cleveland declared in a message to Congress at the end of his first term
that "[c]ommunism is a hateful thing and a menace to peace and organized
government. But the communism of combined wealth and capital ... undermines
the justice and integrity of free institutions, is not less dangerous than the
communism of oppressed poverty and toil."l 46
At the start of the 1890s, economic conditions became more challenging, and
the federal government needed more revenue.14 During this time, the main form of
federal taxation was a property tax, which left the small farmers feeling the heaviest
burden of the federal taxes while the wealthier investors and businessmen in cities
escaped taxation almost completely. 14 The Populist Party demanded a graduated
income tax as part of its 1892 platform, while the Democrats advocated for an
income tax.149 Democrats took control of both the House and the Senate in 1893,'
and an income tax was ultimately passed in 1894.
Income disparity was very pronounced in 1894.' Census data reflected that
90% of the families in the United States only owned 30% of the wealth, and the
remaining top 10% of the families owned over 70% of the wealth.15 2
Senator David Bennet Hill, who had presidential aspirations, warned that the
progressive income tax was an idea imported to the United States by "little squads
of anarchists, communists and socialists."' Yet many proponents of the
progressive income tax championed adopting the tax as a conservative strategy to
proactively avoid rising class anger and resentment. Representative Uriel Hall, a
Missouri Democrat, argued that if he had named the bill, he would have called it:
[A] measure to kill anarchy and keep down socialists ... I tell you when
you oppose a measure of this kind, when you come to the great masses of
the people and say that the wealthy of this Government shall bear none of
its burdens, then you make a foundation for the argument of anarchy,
socialism, and demagoguery, that eventually will sweep back and curse
this country, as it did in France in the days of the French revolution.15
The Congressman argued that passing the bill was symbolic to the ordinary
taxpayer and that if Congress failed to pass it, it would send a clear signal to the
ordinary person that the wealthy had control. This, he argued, could run the risk of
revolution and revolt.
146. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 112.
147. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 494.
148. See id. at 495.
149. Populist Party Platform, 1892 available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5361; See WILLIAM
JENNINGS BRYAN & MARY BAIRD BRYAN, SPEECHES OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 159-179 (Funk &
Wagnalls Co.) (1909).
150. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 46.
151. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (Little Brown) (1954).
152. See id.
153. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 144.
154. Id. at 138.
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Enacting the progressive income tax to prevent an insurgence from the
socialists or the communists seemed to be a motivating factor. "[T]he populists
frightened the industrial barons of the East into thinking that a revolutionary rabble
was gathering at the gates." Congressman McMillan, who was chairman of the
Ways and Means subcommittee during this time, stated in January of 1894,
"[e]very citizen is placed on an equality by this proposition [a tax on wealth]. The
law says: As you have been prospered so pay. As you have received the blessings
of the government, contribute to its support."'56
Others, however, were not convinced. Congressman Walker countered, "the
income tax takes from the wealth of the thrifty and enterprising, and gives to the
shiftless and the sluggard."'1 7 Some congressmen were concerned that the income
tax could be shifted to the poor, persuaded by Chairman Morrill's argument at the
end of the Civil War that people would understate their income and because the
understatements would be under oath, it would lead to the corruption of morals and
ultimately the deception by all taxpayers."s
As the income tax of 1894 was being considered in Congress, several proposals
to amend the income tax to include graduated rates, making the tax progressive, had
been made and were subsequently dismissed.'"9 The substance of the debate
centered on enacting an income tax alone. One senator objected not just to the
income tax, but also to including an exemption amount. Senator Sherman stated,
"[iln a republic like ours, where all men are created equal, this attempt to array the
rich against the poor or the poor against the rich is socialism, communism and
devilism.",o
Eventually, the proponents of the income tax and those who supported one out
of a reactionary fear of socialism and communism were successful, and in 1894, an
income tax was enacted with a flat two percent rate on incomes over $4,000 and on
corporations."' Democrats from the Northeast, where much of the wealth was held
in stocks, bonds, securities, and salaries, Republicans, and others including
Chairman Morrill, opposed a return to a full progressive income tax.162 The
exemption amount of $4,000 did add an aspect of progressivity to the income tax,
even though it was otherwise a flat tax, because the high exemption amount served
to shift more of the tax burden to higher-income taxpayers by excluding most low-
income taxpayers. Corporations had been included in the income tax under the
155. Id. at 114.
156. SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 499.
157. Id. at 500 (quoting Walker of Massachusetts, in a separately published speech under the title The
Income Tax. Remarks of Hon. J. H. Walker. (1894)).
158. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., IST SESS. 2437 (1866) (statement of Rep. Morrill).
159. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 503-504; see also, e.g. move by Senator Peffer to have an exemption
of S1,000 and to have rates begin at 1% and rise progressively to 5%. See id. at 505.
160. Id. at 504 (citing CONG. REC., op. cit. p. 6695).
161. See THE WILSON- GORMAN TARIFF ACT OF 1894; see also ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW
IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 18961-1913 132 (Oxford Press) (1993);
BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 47.
162. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 46.
163. See id. at 47.
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benefit and ability to pay theories of taxation.'6 The new law had been copied
almost word for word from the income tax implemented during the Civil War,
minus the progressivity. 1s Income was defined very broadly and included gifts and
inheritances. 66
After all of the legislative debate and negotiations, however, the income tax
proved fruitless because it was deemed unconstitutional a year later in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company by the United States Supreme Court. 67 As a
result of the Supreme Court decision, an income tax could not be enacted until a
constitutional amendment was passed permitting one. After the Supreme Court's
decision, support began to intensify for an income tax. Democrats introduced
several constitutional amendments for an income tax in 1896.19 The Populist Party
introduced a bill proposing a progressive income tax at least three times to
Congress. The bill was not adopted and neither were a number of constitutional
amendments for an income tax proposed by various democrats that year. At the
same time, however, more momentum was growing for a progressive inheritance
tax over a progressive income tax. 17 In the meantime, to raise revenue, a bipartisan
group in Congress enacted a corporate tax in 1909, limiting the progressivity of the
tax act "to generate enough support."'
Although the income tax had been declared unconstitutional, the threat from
socialism and communism remained. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt,
encouraging Congress to draft a constitutional amendment permitting an income
tax, advocated for a progressive income tax as way to "stave off more radical calls
for industrial democracy."l7 4 He stated that a "graduated income tax of the property
type would be a desirable feature of federal taxation, and it is hoped that one may
be devised which the Supreme Court will declare constitutional."7 7 The
conservative support for the progressive income tax may not have been to raise
revenue, but instead because high-income taxpayers believed that enacting
graduated tax schedules would diminish or eliminate the calls to restructure the
capitalistic system.'76 As another income tax bill was proposed in 1906, Senator
164. See id.
165. See SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 508.
166. See id. at 508-09; see THE WILSON- GORMAN TARIFF ACT OF 1894, supra note 158; see also
STANLEY, supra note 158, at 132.
167. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). It was held unconstitutional to tax underlying real property interest. Interest
dividends and rents violated the prohibition on unapportioned direct taxes in the constitution.
168. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 47-48.
169. See id. at 48.
170. See PERCY DANIELS, CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT, (Pittsburgh Kansan Print) (1896) available at
http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/percy-daniels/cutting-the-gordian-knot-ina/1-cutting-the-gordian-
knot-ina.shtml; see also SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION supra note 24, at 138.
171. TAX HISTORY PROJECT: RECONSTRUCTION TO THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR,
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/THM1866?OpenDocument.
172. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 48-49.
173. Id. at 53.
174. 41 CONG. REC. 27 (1907) (remarks of President Theodore Roosevelt).
175. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX, supra note 5, at 591.
176. See AVI-YONAH, supra note 2, at 1410.
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Joseph Bailey of Texas argued, "[i]f I were counsel for the rich, the first advice that
I would tender them would be to advocate a law like this."7 He argued that an
income tax "would do more to silence the envious voice of anarchy than all of the
benefactions and the charities which they can do."171 In 1910, Senator Borah argued
that the wealthy needed a more equitable tax to protect themselves and their
businesses against the dangers of class resentment. 79 He argued "[e]very time
wealth invades equal opportunity, it is undermining its own stability.",'
The Sixteenth Amendment permitting an income tax was ratified in 1913.
According to one tax historian, Senator Aldrich, the chair of the Senate Finance
Committee, worked with President Taft to draft the Sixteenth Amendment, but he
and the Northeastern Republicans only submitted it for ratification to the states
because they recognized the growing support among the people for an income
tax.181 It was intended as a gesture to merely appease the public. They had,
however, hoped, along with the conservatives, that the measure would fail.18 They
were surprised when the Sixteenth Amendment was ultimately ratified permitting a
progressive income tax.
E. After the Sixteenth Amendment Was Enacted
The first income tax after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment had very
little progressivity to it. There was a 1% tax on incomes above $3,000 and a surtax
up to 6% once incomes reached over $20,000.18 In addition, dividends up to
$20,000 were excluded from the tax.' The tariffs and taxes on alcohol and tobacco
still served as the main sources of revenue for the federal government. There was,
however, significant vocalization expressing a desire for progressivity in the
income tax in the Congressional Record. Congressman Gillett stated, "I appreciate
that there should be a difference between the rich and the poor in the per cent of the
tax and that the weight upon the poor should be made very light."' Congressman
Rayburn stated that allocating tax burdens:
[S]o that the greatest burden will fall on those most able to pay is the true
doctrine advocated and adhered to by the Democratic Party since its
177. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 223.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 252.
180. Id.
181. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 53.
182. See id.; see also 44 CONG. REc. 3974 (1909) (reflecting that even liberal Congressmen, such as
Representative Cummins, did not expect it to be ratified).
183. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 53; see also 44 CONG. REC. 3974 (1909) (reflecting that even
liberal Congressmen, such as Representative Cummins, did not expect it to be ratified).
184. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166, 168 (1913). $3,000 in 1913 would be
equivalent to $69,767 in 2012 and $20,000 in 1913 is equal to $465,113 in 2012.
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78 (1985).
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coming into existence. ... The system of protective tariff built up under
the Republican misrule has worked to make the rich richer and poor
poorer.... It takes from the pockets of those least able to pay and puts it
into the pockets of those most able to pay.1
In 1913, the legislative history indicates that "the tax upon incomes [was] levied
according to ability to pay."' Congressman Fowler said:
The income tax stands out like a great emancipator, with a proclamation
to the world declaring that the time has come when the unequal burdens
of taxation shall no longer rest upon the shoulders of the laboring classes
of this country, but that, instead thereof, these burdens shall be placed
where they properly belong-upon the backs of the rich."'
Congressman Hull had worked for twenty years to get the Constitutional
Amendment passed to permit an income tax and then was charged with drafting the
income tax. He made a presentation in New York City, which he regarded as the
center of the opposition to the income tax.9 He told the audience that, while he was
sympathetic to the new burdens they felt under the progressive income tax, New
York was "the great center of commerce of the nation," and as such it "had to
understand that its power and wealth resulted from the industry of all Americans
and that it was wrong for the wealthy to 'segregate' themselves from their 'fair
share of taxes."'
1 92
F. World War I
There may have been momentum to a transition to a more progressive income
tax because of social injustice and inequality, but there was also opposition to the
tax.m As a result, the largest steps taken toward a progressive income tax came
during times of crisis, particularly war. 194 During both World Wars progressive
income taxes were a significant source of revenue. Support for progressive income
taxes also grew during the World Wars because of the determination and resolve for
"democracy and industrialization, for a restructuring of American Society."'95
Prior to World War I, over 90% of federal revenues came from excise taxes
and tariffs.196 Following both World Wars, the progressive income tax served as a
means to raise revenue both in a time of crisis and as a general source of revenue
188. 50 CONG. REC. 1247 (1913) (statement of Rep. Samuel Rayburn).
189. H.R. Rep. No. 63-5 (1913), quoted in ROBERT M. WILLAN, INCOME TAXES: CONCISE HISTORY AND
PRIMER 139 (1994).
190. 50 CONG. REC. 1250 (1913) (statement of Rep. Hiram Fowler).
191. See WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 287.
192. Id. (quoting Congressman Hull's speech to the New York State Bar Association reprinted in 51
CONG. REC. App. 106).
193. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 1-2.
194. See id. at 2.
195. Id. at 5.
196. WEISMAN, supra note 37, at 290.
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for the federal government.m Moreover, the final achievement of establishing a
progressive income tax extinguished any further calls for a social revolution."
In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of the Treasury William
McAdoo formed an unofficial coalition to undertake a transition to a progressive
income tax.99 They joined with Congressman Kichin, the Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee. Congressman Kichin used his position on the Ways
and Means Committee to advocate for a progressive income tax, with the goals of
social justice and raising revenue.20 World War I presented these Democrats with
the opportunity to forge ahead with the progressive income tax.201 The Revenue Act
of 1916 imposed a progressive income tax that focused on the highest income
taxpayers and also introduced the corporate double tax to reach any wealth or
202income that might escape the personal income tax. The income tax was based on
the ability to pay theory, while the double corporate tax was based on the benefit
203
theory of taxation.
By 1918, 15% of taxpayers had to pay taxes and the wealthiest 1% paid 80% of
the revenues from personal income taxes.204 The marginal rates in 1918 for the top
1% of taxpayers were between 15% and 77%.205 The effective tax rate for those in
the highest marginal rate was 15%.206 The progressive income taxes of 1916 and
1918 were drawn strictly along party lines with very little Republican support.
Republicans might have been willing to support higher taxes if there had been more
of a consumption tax component rather than all progressive income taxes, which
would have shifted some of the tax burden off of the wealthy.207 The Democratic
Party proceeded unilaterally because of their opposition to consumption taxes,
increasing access to economic opportunities and helping the disadvantaged.208
Furthermore, anything less than the highly progressive tax they enacted would have
been politically damaging to President Wilson and would have divided the
209Democratic Party.
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In 1921, the Republican Party won back control of the Presidency and the
Congress.21 Andrew Mellon was appointed Secretary of the Treasury and he sought
to repeal what he viewed as "soak the rich" taxes and the most redistributional
aspects of the progressive income tax."' The Republican Congress and
212administration reduced the tax rates and reduced the income tax's progressivity.
One Republican Senator stated that a graduated tax "is but a modem legislative
adaptation of the communistic doctrine of Karl Marx, who based his radical
philosophy upon the doctrine of equalization of incomes."213 In the first year in
power, the Republicans cut the top rate from 73% to 58%. It was reduced even
further to 25% by 1928.214 The Republicans introduced another tax provision that
reduced progressivity even further, and continues today to significantly affect
progressivity. They introduced a preferential rate on capital gains at 12.5%."'
Without the context of legislative history, the combination of a Republican
President and a Republican Congress and the "[h]igh and progressive federal
taxation during the 1920's poses a historical puzzle, because political and social
conditions seemed hostile to high taxes and to progressive income redistribution." 216
However, Secretary Mellon may have been attempting to silence the labor party and
other populists to prevent socialism or communism from appearing attractive.
Secretary Mellon was very aware that progressive income rates could be used to
217
repress or weaken a rebellion against capitalism. Many republicans and business
leaders wanted to eliminate the income tax and replace it with a national sales tax,
but Secretary Mellon advocated against this, suggesting that some degree of
progressivity and the policy of ability to pay would "demonstrate their civic
responsibility and defuse radical attacks on capital" by recognizing the popular
218support for the wealthy to bear the greater burden under a progressive income tax.
Secretary Mellon argued that progressivity had to be sacrificed to gamer
economic growth.21 Secretary Mellon advocated that less progressive income tax
rates would stimulate economic expansion and prosperity, however, he did not seek
to eliminate the progressive income tax rates altogether.22 He argued that high tax
rates would discourage and reduce entrepreneurial effort. They would be passed
onto consumers, raising the cost of living for everyone including lower-income
taxpayers.22 ' He argued that taxpayers would move their assets into less productive
210. See id. at 72.
211. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 210, 42 Stat. 227, 233-37, repealed by Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 210, 43 Stat. 253, 264.
212. See id.
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22investments, such as tax-exempt bonds, to avoid the tax rates. Secretary Mellon
argued that lower tax rates on the wealthier would encourage them to invest at
higher rates, and in more productive investments.22
Mellon held some unique progressive tax ideas. He had the opinion that wages
224should be taxed at a lower rate than investment income. He stated:
[T]he fairness of taxing more lightly income from wages, salaries or from
investments is beyond question. In the first case, the income is uncertain
and limited in duration; sickness or death destroys it and old age
diminishes it; in the other, the source of income continues; the income
may be disposed of during a man's life and it descends to his heirs.2'
Many legislators in Congress developed a deep fondness for the progressive
income tax. However, their enchantment with the progressive income tax was not
because of the social goals it advanced, the possibilities of redistribution, or the
ability to raise revenue. Their appreciation of the progressive income tax was
because the progressive income tax created opportunities to generate tax benefits,
deductions, expenditures or loopholes for special interest groups, or other
supporters with whom the legislators wanted to gain favor.226 The Congressmen
wielded a great amount of power by using relief from the high rates on behalf of
powerful contributors or constituents.22 For the most part, the legislators were able
to bestow these tax expenditures and breaks without raising awareness by shrewdly
including an exemption buried in the tax code.22 The progressive income tax "had
become an instrument to advance special privilege." 22 9 These tax expenditures,
deductions, and loopholes eroded the progressivity of the high marginal tax rates,
however, for almost 50 years this behavior was not addressed, or often even
acknowledged. While these types of expenditures may continue even today, they
are not quite as valuable because the marginal rates are not as high for the highest
income taxpayers as they once were.
In 1924, a group of eleven Democratic members of the House Ways and Means
Committee asserted that the proposed Mellon Bill was created "for the purpose of
giving principle [sic] relief to the large taxpayer and our [the democratic] plan is
based upon giving relief to all income taxpayers but the larger percentage of relief
to the small taxpayer."2 o Representative Lankford expressed doubts that the Mellon
Bill's trickle-down theory would be effective stating, "[t]he theory of those in
222. See id.
223. See Andrew Mellon, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 8 (1923); "Mellon insisted that [tax
reductions] should go mainly to the rich." GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 1075
(WW Norton & Co. Inc.) (1988); see BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 74.
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power seems to be that if the Congress will only help the railroads, the Wall Street
bankers, the big manufacturing monopolies, and the immensely rich, enough will
ooze through for the laboring man, the farmer, and the common folks."21 He
continued, "[t]he contention of the powers that be is that the way to feed a starving
dumb brute is to give some thoughtless, selfish man all he desires to eat and
perhaps he will leave enough bones for the poor dog to gnaw." 232
G. The Great Depression
The next significant revisions to the progressive income tax took place during
the Great Depression. When the stock market collapsed, President Herbert Hoover
proposed to raise revenues though a national sales tax.233 Many in Congress,
including Congressman Robert Doughton, who was a member of the House Ways
and Means Committee, opposed the national sales tax on the grounds that it
violated the ability to pay concept, and would unduly burden the common people.2 34
The measure was blocked and instead the Revenue Act of 1932 increased the top
marginal tax rate from 25% to 63%, reduced certain personal exemptions, and
231imposed certain excise taxes.
President Hoover lost the 1932 election and President Franklin Roosevelt began
his term in 1933. President Roosevelt supported progressive income taxes based on
236
a taxpayer's ability to pay. Despite this, during his first term, Roosevelt did not
change the standing progressive income tax, and only made small modifications
that otherwise left most of the advancement of the progressive income tax agenda to
231
the House Ways and Means Committee, seeking only symbolic victories. In
1934, President Roosevelt proposed among other tax provisions, to increase the
maximum income tax rate on individuals from 63% to 79%.238 The Revenue Act of
1934 did result in increasing progressivity by raising the rates on capital gains.29
Capital gains still had a preferential rate, but now it was progressive, increasing as
the amount of gain increased.240
In 1935, President Roosevelt sent a surprise message to Congress after
reviewing recent studies from the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Internal
231. 65 CONG. REC. 2570 (1924) (statement of Rep. William Lankford).
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(Little Brown) (1967); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL 53 (Little
Brown) (1973).
237. See MARK J. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION (Cambridge
University Press) (1984); FREIDEL, supra note 231, at 51-49, 446-51.
238. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL, 328
(1960).
239. See The Revenue Act of 1934, H.R. 7835, Pub. No. 216, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
240. See id.; see also BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 84 n.24.
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Revenue Taxation.24 He observed that the "revenue laws have operated in many
ways to the unfair advantage of the few, and they have done little to prevent an
unjust concentration of wealth and economic power."242 The President cautioned
that accumulations of wealth led to the "great and undesirable concentration of
control in relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare of many,
many others. 243 He stated, "whether it be wealth achieved through the cooperation
of the entire community or riches gained by speculation- in either case the
ownership of such wealth of riches represents a great public interest and a great
ability to pay."24
President Roosevelt clarified in a later interview that it was not his intent to
"destroy wealth, but to create a broader range of opportunity, to restrain the growth
of unwholesome and sterile accumulations and lay the burdens of Government
where they can best be carried." 245 Unlike Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon,
President Roosevelt did not believe that one had to choose between progressivity
and growth, but instead he believed they could co-exist.246
During much of President Roosevelt's presidency he had the support of
Congressman Robert Doughton, who served as Chairman of the House Ways and
241
Means Committee for eighteen years. Congressman Doughton opposed large tax
increases and attempted to reallocate the tax burden from lower-income taxpayers
to higher-income taxpayers, believing that lower-income taxpayers had a higher
248overall effective tax rate. With Chairman Doughton's support, Congress raised
effective rates on the high-income taxpayers by almost 50% and the effective tax
241rate on the wealthiest 1% was increased to the highest level it had ever reached.
Additionally, the Treasury Department decided to go after taxpayers that had
evaded taxes.2SO They identified 67 wealthy taxpayers who had used "inventoried
loopholes" and incorporation to reduce their taxes.21 The Roosevelt administration
241. See President Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 1935) available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15088.
242. See id.; see also Roy G. BLAKEY AND GLADYS BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME 366 (1940); CONG.
REc. 79:9659 (1945). In response only one Senator, Senator Long had a comment for the record, he said, "Mr.
President, before the President's message is referred to the Committee on Finance, I wish to make one
comment. I just wish to say Amen!" CONG. REc. 79:9659 (1945).
243. President Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 1935) available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15088; CONG. REC. 78:30; see SCHLESINGER, supra note
233, at 328.
244. Id.
245. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 233, at 328.
246. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 90.
247. See id.
248. See e.g., Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives on Revenue
Revision, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), CONG. REC. 80: 5978-5989 (statement of Chairman Doughton); see
BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 83.
249. CONG. REC. 80: 5978-5989 (the effective rate on the highest 1% taxpayers in 1936 was 16.4%); see
also The Revenue Act of 1934, H.R. 7835, Pub. No. 216, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §117 (1934); see BROWNLEE,
supra note 22, at 92. It also should be noted, however, that the progressivity of the income tax was reduced by
the regressive nature of the social security taxes also adopted under President Roosevelt's reforms. See id.
250. See Report of the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. CONG. REC.
81: 5124-25.
251. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 97.
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pursued these taxpayers for two primary reasons, to at least slow down the practice
of enacting special provisions in the tax code to benefit favored wealthy taxpayers,
and second, to send a message to both low and high-income taxpayers that the tax
was indeed progressive and that the high-income taxpayers were expected to pay
their share. 25 2 President Roosevelt also wanted to publicly expose high-income
taxpayers that had deliberately avoided paying income taxes.253 Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau dissuaded President Roosevelt from publicizing the names and taxes
paid by convincing him that it could be illegal. However, the Treasury Secretary
did give the President the names of the evaders and the data, which President
Roosevelt then passed onto James Farley, the Chair of the Democratic National
Committee and to Homer Cummings, the Attorney General, perhaps hoping the
information would be leaked to the public.
As a result of the pursuit of the high-income taxpayers, Congress unanimously
passed the Revenue Act of 1937, which eliminated many of the loopholes these
256high-income taxpayers had used to avoid taxes. Congress through the Revenue
Act eliminated or reduced the deductions for country estates, yachts, deductions for
multiple trusts, and personal holding companies among other deductions. Following
the enactment of the New Deal policies, President Roosevelt did not try until World
War II to accomplish his economic objectives through tax reforms or increases to
the tax rate because of the political climate, and the objections of conservatives.5
In 1938, following a drop in the stock market, Congress reduced the tax rate
applicable to capital gains, which reduced the progressivity of the income tax at the
258
highest income bracket levels. Congress reduced the capital gains rate to benefit
both taxpayers with small amounts of capital gains and larger deductions and high-
income taxpayers with a larger proportion of the public stock and smaller
deductions.259
Once it became clear that the United States was going to enter World War II,
President Roosevelt and the Congressional bipartisan leadership agreed that large
tax increases were needed to fund the war effort and decrease inflationary
pressures.260 There were disagreements and disputes as to which taxes would be
increased, and how much taxes would be increased. President Roosevelt spoke at a
joint session of Congress after Pearl Harbor in 1942 stating, "[i]n this time of grave
national danger, when all excess income should go to win the war, no American
citizen ought to have a net income, after he has paid his taxes, of more than
252. See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928-1938 324-337
(Houghton Mifflin) (1959); see also JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF
URGENCY, 1938-1941 22-30 (Houghton Mifflin) (1965); JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU
DIARIES, YEARS OF WAR, 1941-1945 3 3-78 (Houghton Mifflin) (1967).
253. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 97.
254. See BLUM, YEARS OF CRISIS supra note 247, at 327-337; see BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 97.
255. Id.
256. See The Revenue Act of 1937, H.R. 8234, Pub. L. No. 75-377, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937); see also
BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 98.
257. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 104.
258. The Revenue Act of 1938, H.R. 9682, Pub. L. No. 75-554 § 117 (b), 52 Stat. 447, 501 (1939).
259. See Lee, supra note 211, at 13.
260. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 108.
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$25,000." 261 No confiscatory tax above $25,000 was ever actually proposed, and
262the intent was most likely to rally Congress to increase progressive tax rates.
With the need for revenue, Congressional members once again suggested the
traditional stand-by proposals. Legislators suggested a national sales tax that the
Treasury Secretary suggested placed too high of a burden on the lower one third of
taxpayers. Instead, the Treasury Secretary proposed increasing business taxes,
which business leaders and the Senate Finance Committee responded would
severely cripple businesses, unable to withstand impending financial crises.26 Then
the Treasury Secretary, along with several scholars, suggested a graduated spending
tax, but Congress rejected that proposal as too radical and economically risky at
.264
such a desperate time.
Finally, Congress agreed to increase the progressivity of the income tax rates as
a way to control inflation and raise revenue.26 The committees, however, protected
loopholes in the income tax that favored the wealthy. 1 The result of these
protections were that progressive tax measures focused more heavily on wage
income than on income from rents, interest and profits, because of concerns
267surrounding financial pressures and the threat of another depression. Congress, in
order to raise enough revenue while still maintaining the loopholes for the wealthy,
broadened the tax base, increasing tax rates on the salaries and wages of the middle
161
class as well as high-income taxpayers.
The culmination of changes to the income tax over the course of the two World
Wars resulted in a tax policy that was more "progressively redistributional."2 69 The
tax rates were increased to 13% on the first $2,000 of income and 82% on incomes
over $200,000, the highest marginal rates up to that point at any time in United
States history.270 The effective tax rate on taxpayers in the highest marginal tax rates
was 58.6% in 1944.21 Also of note, Democrats were in power during both World
Wars and were typically more committed to progressive income taxes, generally
272opposing regressive taxes.2 It was President Roosevelt's hope that the revenues
raised (beyond those needed for the war) would be distributed progressively.27 He
and the other New Deal legislators felt that a progressive income tax was the most
274
effective way to ensure federal programs of social justice.
261. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives on Revenue Revision,
73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934), CONG. REC. 80: 4448 (statement of President Roosevelt),
262. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 108.
263. See id. at 110-111.
264. See id. at 111.
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267. See The Revenue Act of 1942, H.R. 7378, Pub. No. 753, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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271. See Brownlee, Atlas supra note 201, at 60 tbl.2.5.
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By the end of World War II the income tax had become commonplace to the
ordinary American rather than just to high-income taxpayers. In 1945 almost 90%
of the labor force filed income tax returns.275 "Mass taxation had become more
important than class taxation."'276 During the war the effective tax rate increased to
more than 40% and even reached 58.6% in 1944.277 In 1945 the top 1% produced
32% of the revenue.27 As one tax historian concluded, the revisions to tax policy
during World War II resulted in a progressive but broadly based income tax and
importantly, "[fjor the first time since the early nineteenth century, the two political
parties agreed on the essential elements of the nation's fiscal policy."27 9
H. The Mad Men Years- The 1950s and 1960s
Following World War II, in the 1950s and 1960s the Democrats abandoned, or
to put it more gently, lost their enthusiasm for, increasing tax rates on higher-
280
income taxpayers. Or more appropriately, there was no room to increase rates.
The tax rates did appear extremely high on high-income taxpayers, but, with all of
the tax expenditure items and loopholes, the tax burden imposed on high-income
taxpayers was in reality much less. The fagade of high tax rates served to appease
the common public while the wealthy constituents benefited from special tax
breaks.28 1
The progressivity of the income tax was in fact, "a colossal illusion."282 In the
beginning of 1954, while President Eisenhower was in office, the highest marginal
tax rate was 92%, it was lowered to 91%, but the effective tax rate (the actual, real
tax rate) was only 32.2%. Although Republican President Eisenhower was not in
favor of high tax rates, he was not willing to reduce tax rates until the tax
284expenditures and loopholes were reduced. Southern Democrats and Northeastern
Democrats had different reasons for ignoring, or being complacent about the lack of
true progressivity in the tax code and pursuing other ways to assist disenfranchised
constituents.285 The progressivity they achieved during World War II had proven
their commitment to the progressive income tax and now they turned their focus
elsewhere.286
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280. See id. at 122.
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283. See REvENUE ACT OF 1951, ch. 521, § 101, 65 Stat. 452, 459-61; IR.C. §1 (1954), 68A State. 1, 1-7
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In the 1950s the Democrats in Congress allowed the effective maximum
income tax rate to be reduced to 25% from the 40% it was during the war and from
the high of 58.6% it had been in 1944. The public so staunchly supported
progressive income taxation that even legislators who believed the rate structure
.288
needed to be revised, "felt it impossible to decrease the rate of progression."
In Senate Hearings in 1963, Senators heard the actual hard facts reflecting the
degree to which high-income taxpayers were benefiting from low tax rates on
capital gains.28 The evidence demonstrated that 75% of the income of high-income
taxpayers was from capital gains and was therefore taxed at preferential rates,
290
further affecting the progressivity of the income tax. Senator Douglas commented
at the hearings, "I find those figures shocking. Here are 20 men with adjusted gross
incomes of over $5 million who paid no taxes." 291 The effective rate for these
taxpayers was 22% while the maximum ordinary tax rate was 90%.292
In 1964, Democratic President Johnson called on Congress to reduce tax rates
even further. Congress responded by lowering the tax rate on capital gains,
allowing more generous depreciation allowances, and cutting the marginal tax rates
on high-income taxpayers.293 The top marginal rate was reduced from 91% to
70%.294 It does not appear that any Congressman objected to the reductions. The
rationale for the tax cuts was to increase the amount of national income and to help
with large deficits without increasing the cost of living or putting expansion at
291
risk. It appears that in almost all cases during the presidencies of President John
F. Kennedy, President Johnson, President Truman, President Nixon and President
Ford and up until President Carter, there was bipartisan consensus for most tax
296
provisions and any tax debates were mild and not publicly contested.
Tax expenditures, deductions, and preferences intended to benefit certain
297
classes of taxpayers continued to be very popular with lawmakers. The
introduction of joint returns and the mortgage interest deduction were tax
expenditures favoring the middle class and affecting the overall progressivity of the
income tax. Accelerated depreciation was a tax expenditure affecting the
298
progressivity of the income tax that primarily benefited high-income taxpayers.
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In the 1960s and 1970s lawmakers showed no restraint when it came to
creating tax expenditures, deductions, and loopholes. The special tax breaks were
particularly attractive to members of Congress because they allowed legislators to
give away tax benefits to special interest groups or constituents without having to
299go through the process of obtaining direct expenditure approval for the funds.
Both Democrats and Republicans used tax expenditures freely, reducing the
progressivity of the income tax, to further whatever agenda they prioritized at that
point in time.300 As one commentator noted, "no one controls tax policy and the
tendency is for politicians to confer as many benefits on as many groups as is
politically feasible."30 It also allowed both Democratic and Republican
congressional members to create tax programs benefiting certain interest groups
without being subject to public scrutiny because the benefits were essentially
302hidden within the progressive income tax.
I. The Inflation of the 1970s
103
During the 1970s inflation there was a huge strain on the economy. Because
of rampant inflation, many individuals who had previously been exempt or
excluded from the income tax now fell outside of the exemption levels and were
suddenly subject to the income tax.304 This included many low-income taxpayers,
including low-income taxpayers with dependents facing the income tax for the first
time. The tax brackets were not adjusted for inflation, so tax rates that were
originally intended for high-income taxpayers were now encompassing middle-
income taxpayers and tax rates intended for middle-income taxpayers were now
305capturing low-income taxpayers who should have been exempt from tax.
Moreover, the top brackets were not adjusted to tax high-income taxpayers
proportionately, so they were paying the same rates as many middle-income
306
taxpayers.
In 1976 while running for President, candidate Jimmy Carter referred to the
federal income tax system as "a disgrace to the human race" and promised to
eliminate many if not all of the tax expenditure provisions that favored high-income
taxpayers.307 As a result of the combination of dramatic inflation, pressures on the
tax system such as various tax benefits and expenditures, and the rollback of tax
299. See THOMAS J. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION (Quorum Books) (1980).
300. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (Harv.
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(9th ed. 2002).
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(1990); JOSEPH J. MINARIK, MAKING TAX CHOICES 37 tbl. 4 (Univ. Pr. of Am.) (1985).
306. See CONLAN, supra note 299, at 19.
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rates in the 1950s and 1960s, progressivity was completely eroded. President Carter
promised to restore progressivity to the income tax.30
President Carter found it impossible to implement any of his promised changes
because, as he discovered, both Democratic and Republican Congressional
members wanted to expand the tax preferences for the rich.m The legislators were
not about to give up the powerful tool they had in tax expenditures. Congressional
members justified their free and unhampered reign over tax expenditures by relying
on the following theory: using tax expenditures for individuals who are savers and
investors, who also earn a high income, will result in more saving and more
investment."o The theory also provided that if the tax preferences were eliminated,
as President Carter had pledged, Congress and President Carter would essentially
be specifically penalizing taxpayers who choose to save or invest their money.
President Carter faced two issues in office while trying to fulfill his promise for
a more progressive income tax. The first problem was the high rates of inflation that
resulted in taxpayers falling into tax brackets never intended to cover them, in
particular low-income taxpayers who should have been exempt from the income
tax. The second problem was the resistance President Carter faced from
Congressional Democrats and Republicans to change the system because they did
312
not want to give up their ability to use and offer tax expenditures and benefits.
Conservatives in Congress proposed to index the tax rates for inflation, which
would have addressed the first of President Carter's challenges, but it did not
address the second of the challenges; the abuse and misuse by the legislature of tax
expenditures and tax preference items. In addition, many legislators were concerned
that indexing tax rates to inflation would be too confusing and complicated, while
others were concerned with what indexing the rates would do to revenue."' While
Republicans in Congress quickly supported the indexing proposal, the Carter
administration was ultimately able to block it.314
The Republicans countered with a second proposal, which again would have
addressed the first of President Carter's problems, but not the second. It also would
have dealt a severe blow to the progressivity of the income tax as a whole.
Congressman Kemp proposed slashing tax rates across the board with a 30%
reduction."' When Congressman Kemp's proposal did not garner enough support,
he joined with Republican Senator Roth to reduce tax rates 30% over three years, at
316
10% a year, rather than a 30% reduction all at once. The proposal might have
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made it through Congress, but President Carter promised to veto it and therefore the
plan was not passed."' Meanwhile, Democrats in Congress led by Senator Russell
Long, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, with support from
Representative Al Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
began to discuss a proposal for a value added tax on consumption."' President
Carter argued that a value added tax on consumption would be regressive, and
therefore would not restore any progressivity to the income tax. 9 Republicans
argued that a value added tax would make government larger.320 Facing opposition
321
from both sides, the bill was not brought to a vote.
As the 1970s came to a close, President Carter was unable to affect any of the
promises for tax changes he had made during his campaign.
J. The Reagan Years
The income tax underwent a major reformation during the presidency of
322
Ronald Reagan. When President Ronald Reagan was elected, the Republicans
also gained control of Congress. Beginning at the start of President Reagan's term,
legislators from both sides of the aisle, Democrats and Republicans, introduced
nearly a dozen bills for a flat tax.32 In most of the proposals, there was a base
exemption amount before the flat tax applied, and thus remained progressive in that
one respect. But other than the exemption amounts, the flat tax proposals would
324have completely eliminated progressivity in the income tax. Supporters of a flat
tax included the Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Senator Dole who was
the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, and Democratic Senator Bill Bradley
who was also a member of the Senate Finance Committee.32 Eventually President
Reagan and many of his advisors became convinced that abandoning the
progressive income tax and moving to a flat tax, while completely eliminating tax
317. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 136.
318. See TAX RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1979, H.R. 5665 96th Cong. (Oct. 22, 1979).
319. See BROWNLEE,supra note 22, at 139.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); THE TAX
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, Pub. L. No. 970248, 51 U.S.L.W. 10 (Sept. 14, 1982).
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expenditures would be the most effective way to raise revenue without having to
326raise tax rates.
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan wanted to advance his own flat tax proposal,
and he was not convinced that President Reagan had fully committed to a flat tax.327
So to promote his proposal, Treasury Secretary Regan set out to shock President
Ronald Reagan by pointing out that the President's personal secretary paid more in
taxes than General Electric, Boeing, General Dynamics, and over fifty more large
companies combined.32 Warren Buffet often cites the same dynamic when
advocating for more progressive rates. President Obama recently revealed that he
also pays a lower tax rate than his secretary, also advocating for more progressive
income tax rates.329
When President Reagan began to evaluate the flat tax plans, however, it
became clear to him that it was inaccurate to claim that tax rates would not
increase. That was only true for some high-income taxpayers whose tax rates would
not increase. But if high-income taxpayers had been the beneficiaries of the tax
expenditures that were being eliminated, their tax rates would increase. According
to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan, the number of low-income taxpayers that
would also see an increase in tax rates was the most disturbing to President Reagan.
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan said President Reagan was concerned that a flat
tax plan would reduce or eliminate the progressivity in the tax code and that the flat
tax would result in increasing taxes for lower-income taxpayers.33
Another issue with the flat tax was that several of the President's economic
advisors began to question whether the plan raised a sufficient amount of
revenue. 33  President Reagan's plan to eliminate tax expenditures and other
loopholes stemmed from his desire for horizontal equity, making sure that equally
situated taxpayers are taxed the same and that there are not preferences available to
one and not the other. He was not as concerned about vertical equity, which relates
to how progressive a tax system is.332 Democrats did object to the flat tax and did
not raise concerns over eliminating progressivity from the income tax.
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In the end, President Ronald Reagan did not enact a flat tax. President Reagan's
revisions to the income tax also did not repeal the income tax, and although the rate
of progressivity was dramatically reduced, it did retain some degree of
progressivity. His tax proposals were successful in raising revenue."' Some of
President Reagan's proposals were aligned with the theory of increasing the
progressivity in the income tax. For example, matching the capital gains rate to the
income tax rate, thereby eliminating the capital gains preference, and President
Reagan's proposal to eliminate the tax expenditures resulted in increasing
progressivity. President Reagan strengthened the progressive changes that had been
made in World War II by eliminating the hidden tax breaks and special
expenditures that had pervaded the income tax, although these changes have been
undermined in the subsequent decades.334
President Reagan wanted to cut taxes for high-income taxpayers because he
believed it would stimulate the economy. He proposed cutting all tax rates and
promised to retain the progressivity of the income tax."' The tax cuts President
Reagan proposed ultimately benefited the wealthy more than they relieved the tax
burden on the poor. In particular the low-income taxpayers who had unintentionally
become subject to the income tax as a result of the inflation of the 1970s were
insufficiently relieved of their tax burden.336 In order to pay for an accelerated
depreciation method that business lobbyists requested, President Reagan dropped
the portion of the proposal that would have indexed the tax rate for inflation,
leaving lower-income taxpayers with the tax burden unfairly imposed by the
inflation of the 1970s."' In 1981, the final bill provided for a 23% tax rate
reduction."
After the 1981 Tax Act was passed, the federal government needed to raise
revenue to pay for the increase in the defense budget that Reagan requested.33 9
President Reagan was unwilling to raise individual income tax rates, but he did
support repealing tax expenditures, including the special deductions, credits and
340preferences that permeated the tax code. Progressivity might not have been the
motive behind President Reagan's decision to raise revenue by eliminating many of
the tax expenditures, many of the provisions resulted in supporting progressivity.
The rampant tax expenditures, breaks, and benefits enacted by legislators had
eroded the progressivity of income tax since President Eisenhower took office.
Once the special tax provisions were removed, more high-income taxpayers became
333. See THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); THE TAX
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, Pub. L. No. 970248,51 U.S.L.W. 10 (Sept. 14, 1982).
334. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 8.
335. See id. at 141.
336. See id at 141 n39.
337. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 143; JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM AND ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN
AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM, 16-18 (Vintage)
(1987); CATHIE J. MARTIN, SHIFTING THE BURDENS: THE STRUGGLE OVER GROWTH AND CORPORATE
TAXATION, 47 (U. of Ch. Press) (1991).
338. See THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
339. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 153.
340. See THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, Pub. L. No. 970248, 51 U.S.L.W.
10 (Sept. 14, 1982) and THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
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subject to the marginal tax rates. Conveniently, President Reagan did use
progressivity as a rationale for the repeals, arguing that eliminating the tax
expenditures would restore fairness to the income tax as a justification to gain
public support when he encountered resistance from Republicans in Congress.34'
Even with President Reagan's modifications the overall progressivity in the
income tax continued to decline while he was in office. The average effective tax
rate and the rate of progressivity fell from 1980 to 1985.342 Despite the early
decrease, the income tax rates and the rate of progressivity rose again from 1985 to
1993, although payroll taxes affected the progressivity of the tax rates overall.343
According to the Congressional Budget Office, once President Reagan enacted his
initial set of tax proposals in the early 1980s, income tax rates were dramatically
reduced for the highest income earners, and were reduced by lesser amounts for
other taxpayers. For the bottom 20% of taxpayers, tax rates actually increased
because the payroll tax increased to extend the solvency of the Social Security
system.
President Reagan enacted a second set of tax revisions in 1986. President
Reagan stated that after passing the 1986 Tax Reform Act he felt like they had "just
played the world series of tax reform and the American people won."344 The 1986
Tax Reform Act reduced individual tax rates across the board, reducing the top
marginal rate from 50% to 28%, increasing personal exemptions and standard
deductions to benefit low-income taxpayers and thereby allowing many individuals
to avoid paying taxes at all. It also expanded the earned income tax credit to better
address tax penalties faced by the working poor and increased the capital gains rate
for high-income taxpayers from 20% to 28%.345 For the first time since 1921 capital
gains did not have a special preferential rate. Instead they were taxed at the same
rate as ordinary income. Because higher-income taxpayers generally have a greater
share of capital gain income, the reduced rates on capital gains had always reduced
the amount of progressivity in income tax, irrespective of the ordinary income
rates.346 The effective tax rate on the taxpayers in the highest marginal tax bracket
after the 1986 Act was 22.1%.347 Certain provisions, particularly the overall low
348rates, reduced the progressivity of the income tax. Eliminating the tax preferences
and benefits for high-income taxpayers, increasing the capital gains rate, and
creating higher exemption levels allowed more low-income taxpayers to avoid
paying income tax and alleviated some of the decrease in progressivity.349
341. See Text of the Address by the President to the Nation (August 16, 1982); Fact Sheet, The Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.
342. See Economist Examine Whether Progressivity has Regressed, TAX NOTES, 1520, (Sept 21, 1992).
343. See id.
344. Ronald Reagan, "Remarks by the President at the Signing Ceremony for Tax Reform Legislation,"
October 22, 1986.
345. See Lee, supra note 210 at 2.
346. See id.
347. See Brownlee, Atlas supra note 201 at 60 tbl.2.6.
348. See Lee, supra note 211, at 1.
349. See id. at 74.
2012-13] 161
Journal ofLegislation
The severe reduction of the number of marginal rates resembled a variation of a
flat tax. Senator Kerry stated, "I am troubled by the fact that the bill abandons our
traditional commitment to a progressive rate structure in the Tax Code. When added
to the burden of the payroll taxes, the two rates in this bill create what comes close
to a flat tax rate for all Americans, with effective tax rates that actually decline as
income rises into the range of the wealthy.",o Senator Chiles stated, "How fair is
tax reform when the average taxpayer ... receives a tax cut of a couple hundred
dollars when the most wealthy individual receives a tax cut of almost 3 grand. . .
and, in fact, includes a higher marginal tax rate of 33 percent for the upper-middle-
income individuals, while offering a lower 28-percent rate for the very wealthy?"a35
The growth in income and wealth inequality has increased to a greater degree since
the tax changes implemented during the Reagan administration.352
K. Bush Senior's Quick Foray into the Progressive Income Debate
George H.W. Bush set out to reduce progressivity and he ended up increasing
it. Just as when President Reagan took office, once President George H.W. Bush
was elected, a rush of several proposals came from Congress including a
consumption tax, a value added tax, a national sales tax, and a flat tax. "The
American public seemed bored or bemused by this brief reform campaign. If
anything, Americans retained their attachment to the principle of progressive
taxation and were reluctant to sacrifice that principle."353 The most significant
change that President George H.W. Bush proposed was to reduce the capital gains
rate from the 28% increase under President Reagan to 15%. This would have
undermined one of the only progressive highlights from President Reagan's tax
reform and would have reduced progressivity because high-income taxpayers earn
most capital gain income.
The federal government needed revenue, but President George H.W. Bush had
made his famous pledge not to raise taxes. Senate Majority Leader Democrat
George Mitchell and President Bush came to an informal agreement, a truce;
President Bush would not attempt to lower any taxes and Senator Mitchell would
not embarrass President Bush by revealing that a tax increase was necessary or
remind the public of his pledge when the President came a year later to request the
tax increase. As a result, the Bush administration strategically planned to wait a
35
year before suggesting a bill with the reduced capital gains rate.
350. 132 CONG. REc. at S13, 893 (1986) (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
351. 132 CONG. REc. at S13, 939 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles).
352. See Beverly Moran, Wealth Distribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L.J. 319, 319-21 (2010).
353. BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 180.
354. BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 182 ("[George H.W. Bush and Secretary of the Treasury Brady] were
both members of 'old money' families with capital tied up in highly appreciated assets, and they may well
have had a first-hand appreciation of the argument that lowering the taxation of capital gains would encourage
the reinvestment of such assets in more productive activities.").
355. See DARMAN, supra note 320, at 200, 202,209, 213.
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The supply side Republicans in Congress had other plans though and insisted
on moving forward to reduce the capital gains tax rate immediately."' President
George H.W. Bush decided to align himself with the powerful Congressional
Republicans and supported a bill to reduce the capital gains rate. In exchange,
Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, feeling that President Bush had violated his
promise not to lower taxes in the first year, blocked a vote on the capital gains tax
cut and stopped bipartisan negotiations on the 1991 budget. As a result of the
deficit and the desperate need for revenue, the Bush administration was forced to
request a tax increase. The irony is that because President Bush was so insistent on
lowering taxes for high-income taxpayers, he ended up being forced to request a tax
358
increase.
The initial taxes the Bush administration proposed were not progressive. They
319included a variety of consumption taxes, excise taxes, and a value added tax.
Eventually, the reduction in the capital gains rate was removed from the bill and
revenue was raised through taxes on home heating oil, a regressive tax. Congress
also chose to eliminate a gasoline tax from the bill and made up for the missing
revenue by raising the highest marginal tax rate from 28% to 31%. The tax bill
increased the earned income tax credit, benefiting low-income taxpayers and adding
some progressive income tax reform.3o When finally completed, the 1990 bill
resulted in a more progressive income tax, and in exchange, Congressional
Democrats agreed to reduce the national budget deficit.31 What had begun with a
proposal to make the tax system less progressive ironically resulted in creating a
more progressive income tax.
L. The Clinton Years
Presidents Reagan and Bush set out to eliminate or at least decrease the amount
of progressivity in the income tax. They had mixed success, with some policies
increasing progressivity and some not. Once President Clinton was elected, there
was a strong popular movement to restore progressivity to the income tax. As a
result, opponents of the progressive income tax came in an onslaught, attempting to
eliminate the progressive tax, providing alternative proposals and of most interest,
going so far as to call their own regressive tax plans "progressive" to engender
support among the American public. This indicates that opponents of the
356. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 187.
357. See id. at 187-188.
358. See id. at 188.
359. See DARMAN, supra note 320, at 246-47.
360. See OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
See generally George H.W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Federal Budget Agreement," October 2,
1990, Public Papers of George W. Bush,
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public-papers.php?id=229 1&year-1 990&month=10 (appealing to the
American public to pressure congress to pass the OBRA 1990).
361. See C. Eugene Steuerle, Financing the American State at the Turn of the Century, in FUNDING THE
MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941-1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE 400 (Camb.
Univ. Press) (1996); C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC
AGENDA 163-84 (Urban Inst. Press) (1992).
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progressive income tax recognized that the American public was strongly
supportive of the progressive income tax. Therefore to generate enough support for
their bills, proponents had to create the appearance of progressivity, either by
claiming a regressive bill was actually progressive or perhaps by inserting a small
progressive element to the plan allowing the lawmaker to point to the provision and
claim it represented progressivity. No new theories or rationales for the progressive
income tax developed under the Clinton administration. Instead, it was merely a
plan to restore some of the progressive elements that had been eliminated under
prior administrations.
President Clinton was a strong supporter of progressive income tax reform.36
Unfortunately, once President Clinton came into office he had to prioritize reducing
the deficit over tax cuts, in particular for the middle class.3 63 Instead, the Clinton
administration focused on reducing the deficit and increasing progressivity by
increasing taxes. The 1993 Act increased the marginal tax rates on the highest
364individual income taxpayers and increased the Earned Income Tax Credit.
President Clinton placed particular emphasis on ensuring that the tax rate increases
made the income tax more progressive, highlighting the taxes on families earning
more than $200,000 a year would pay for 80% of the increased revenues raised
under the tax act.
After President Clinton failed to reduce tax rates for the middle class, the
Republicans won control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives in
1995. When they took office, many conservatives began to propose "revolutionary"
ways to restructure and completely revise the United States taxing system. Almost
all of the proposals were regressive and would have had redistributionary effects
(and were recycled proposals seen over and over again in this analysis of legislative
history). None of the proposals garnered any large amount of public support. The
proponents of these regressive proposals recognized how fundamental progressivity
is to the income tax system and how ingrained it is to the American public and
therefore they sought to prove that their proposals were in fact progressive.
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee Representative Archer, along with other congressional authors
sponsored the "Contract for America," bill. Other proposals included consumption
taxes and flat taxes. Senator Arlen Specter tried to make his proposal sound
progressive by arguing that his flat tax proposal would "force many higher income
taxpayers to pay their fair share of taxes." Critics of the "Contract for America"
saw it as a regressive tax that was an "affront to fundamental fairness and
362. See ELIZABETH DREW, ON THE EDGE: THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY (1994); BOB WOODWARD, THE
AGENDA: INSIDE THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE (1994).
363. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 194.
364. See THE OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 379
(1993).
365. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 211.
366. See Linder, supra note 50, at 908.
367. The Flat Tax and Small Business: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Finance of the H.
Comm. On Small Business, 104th Cong. 178 (1995) (statement of Arlen Specter).
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decency" 68 because it would take "food from the mouths of children and heat from
the homes of senior citizens."36 The "Contract for America" would have dealt a
severe blow to vertical equity and the progressivity of the income tax, perhaps
eliminating it all together. Vice President Al Gore called the proposal, "Robin Hood
in Reverse. 370 Several Senate Republicans on the Senate Finance Committee
voiced concerns or opposition to the tax cuts proposed in the "Contract for
America" proposal.m' The Senate ultimately voted it down.n
Other Republican proposals promoted eliminating the income tax, and in
particular, strongly encouraged the repeal of the progressive tax.3 73 Once the
"Contract for America" lost its bid in the Senate, Representative Archer with
Senator Richard Luger proposed a national sales tax or a consumption tax.374 In this
version of a national sales tax, Representative Archer and Senator Luger proposed a
16% sales tax rate on everything except food and medical services and a complete
elimination of the income tax.
In 1994 House Majority Leader Dick Armey proposed a flat tax, claiming it
was, "based on the idea of fairness we learned in grade school: Everyone should be
treated the same." 7  His version of a flat tax, at 17%, taxed all wages, salaries, and
pensions, but exempted all unearned income.7 This flat tax claimed simplicity but
it was highly regressive. All income from investments and other types of non-wage
or non-salary income was tax-free. Trying to gain public support, Representative
Armey attempted to claim that his regressive tax was, "the definition of
progressive."7 Democratic Minority Leader Senator Gephardt called the flat tax
"the largest redistribution of income in the history of the country." Senator
Gephardt instead wanted to lower the tax rate for most taxpayers to 10% and to
include a high degree of progressivity for tax rates going up to 34%."0 Senator
Gephardt's plan claimed to continue to permit a deduction for home mortgage
368. 141 Cong. Rec. 2991 (1995) (statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt).
369. See id.
370. See Michael Wines, Gingrich Promises to Tie Tax Relief to Cuts in Deficit, NY TIMES (April 4,
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WASHINGTON POST (March 14, 1995).
372. See id.
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Ways and Means, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Rep., 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (Jan. 5, 1995).
374. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 1.
375. See Just the Job for Jack Kemp, THE ECONOMIST, (Apr 8, 1995); Alternatives to our Current Tax
System , Congressional Record (House- June 8, 1995) H5704 (favoring the bill particularly because it would
result in repealing the 16" Amendment and would ask the states to collect the funds while dismantling the
IRS)(Nick Smith).
376. See Dick Armey, Review Merits ofFlat Tax, WALL ST. J. A 16. (June 16, 1994).
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interest, continue the earned income tax credit and retain the capital gains
preference, and put up to 75% of taxpayers under the new 10% rate.38'
Another proposal from the Senate was called the Unlimited Savings Allowance
Tax (the USA Tax). It claimed to retain the progressive income tax, eliminating tax
expenditures, adding an unlimited deduction for savings, a partial deduction for
educational expenses, and a credit for social security taxes. This would have been
a combination of a progressive income tax with a consumption tax. It also would
have included an 11% value added tax."' The USA Tax was very reminiscent of the
Spending Tax that Treasury Secretary Thomas Adams had proposed after World
War I and had also been favored by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau during
World War II.384 A proposal was also made to eliminate the progressive income tax
altogether in favor of a national sales tax.
President Clinton chose not to endorse or engage any of these proposals for
reform. As one tax historian noted, there was no motive for President Clinton to try
to radically overhaul the tax system."' There was severe partisanship dividing the
executive and the legislative branches and President Clinton did not see the need for
a dramatic reform of the tax code, particularly to one that would result in regressive
386
taxes.
CBO data illustrates that the changes enacted by President Clinton and the first
President Bush restored progressivity of the federal tax system to the same level
experienced in the early 1980s before the 1986 Tax Act.38 The increase in
progressivity was muted by a cut in the capital gains tax in 1997 reversed that
388
pattern for very high-income families. In the late 1990s there was a very dramatic
increase in the incomes of higher-income workers, which contributed to an increase
in effective tax rates, since a progressive tax system collects larger shares of income
when the growth in income exceeds inflation.38
M. George W Bush, Attacks on the Progressive Income, and Recent Laws
When George W. Bush took office in 2001 he planned to make tax cuts as
significant as those made by President Reagan 20 years before him." A critical
difference is that President Bush did not take office with the extremely high tax
rates Reagan encountered, or the complex network of tax expenditures and benefits
that were used to undermine the progressivity of the income tax.
381. See id.
382. See USA TAX ACT OF 1995 S.722 by Sens Nunn and Domenici, Congressional Record (Senate- April
25, 1997), S5664.
383. See id.
384. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 204.
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When President Bush took leadership Republicans also controlled the
Congress. Another difference between President Bush and President Reagan is that
President Reagan sought to retain some progressivity in the income tax and was
cognizant that if rates were adjusted in a certain way, the tax burdens would fall too
hard on low-income taxpayers."' President George W. Bush's tax proposals either
completely eliminated progressivity or severely limited it. Even though President
Bush wanted to dismantle the progressive tax that President Reagan had sought to
keep intact, he often invoked arguments that Reagan had used to leverage President
Reagan's popularity. While on the campaign trail, Candidate George W. Bush
suggested a series of tax rate cuts at all levels, but the plan benefited high-income
taxpayers the most.3 93 He repeated President Reagan's argument that cutting taxes
394would stimulate growth of the economy.
Following the election, polls reflected that the American public ranked debt
repayment and continued social spending as higher priorities than tax cuts.395
Ignoring the polls, the Bush administration ran with the assumption that most
American wanted tax cuts and made cutting taxes and revising the underlying
principles of progressivity in the income tax the highest priority of his
administration. Democrats argued that if there was money to cut taxes, the cuts
should be made for low-income taxpayers who were more likely to spend their tax
savings, producing an immediate stimulus to the economy. Irrespective of these
challenges, President Bush passed his tax cut proposals in the first year of his
presidency.3 97 It reduced the tax rates including the highest and lowest rates and
eliminated the estate tax.398 Initially, the changes in rates and other tax revisions,
such as educational benefits and an increase in the child tax credit, did not affect the
progressivity of the tax code very much; nevertheless, President George W. Bush
had a larger plan in place, which was implemented incrementally to drastically
overhaul the progressivity of the income tax.3 99 A drop in income in 2001 reduced
the average tax bill, but the tax cuts enacted since 2001 had a far larger impact on
400revenue.
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In 2002, President George W. Bush proposed a consumption tax, which would
have completely eliminated the progressive income tax.401 In addition to his
consumption tax proposal, he also began to consider making dividends tax-free.40
In 2003 Congress enacted a series of tax cuts that began a shift toward a
consumption tax system and away from a progressive income tax.40 3 President
Bush's revisions to the tax system cut taxes so dramatically that it caused a large
drop in revenue, potentially risking an "episode of extreme fiscal stress ... to
materialize if the Bush tax cuts turn out to have made the tax system inadequate to
meet the economic challenges facing the nation during the twenty-first century." 404
President Bush not only decreased taxes, creating this possibility of financial
distress, but he also increased the deficit. President Bush did not exercise the fiscal
restraint of former President Reagan or his numerous other predecessors. The
proposed cuts were so dramatic that 450 economists, including 10 Nobel Prize
winners, took out a full-page ad in the New York Times pleading with President
Bush not to enact the cuts.405 The economists released a statement through the
Economic Policy Institute contending that the cuts would increase income
406inequality, increase the budget deficit, and fail to provide economic growth.
The Bush administration proposed additional cuts: including a proposal to
completely exempt dividends from taxation, permitting individuals to move
$60,000 a year worth of investments into tax-free accounts among others. The
income tax would remain in place but would only apply to wages, salaries, and
rents.40 High-income taxpayers who held wealth in investment accounts and
generated income from those investments rather than from wages or salaries would
have a significantly lower rate of tax (or perhaps no tax) while laborers would bear
the burden of funding the federal government's operations. The final legislation as
enacted in 2003 did not make dividends tax free but did reduce their tax rates to
15%, further affecting the progressivity of the income tax because dividends are
typically earned by high-income taxpayers.40 All of these proposed cuts would
have diminished the tax codes progressivity even more. In addition, the President's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform rejected the proposal for a national retail
401. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bush, After Gaining Tax Cut, Is Taking Aim at Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/16/us/bush-after-gaining-tax-cut-is-taking-aim-at-tax-
code.html.
402. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ANN. REP. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS, in 2002 ECON. REP.
PRESIDENT 7, 23-64.
403. See BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 1.
404. , Id. at 8; in fact the plan appeared to be that if the revenue was cut, the spending would soon just
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the deficit, see David Firestone, Washington Talk: Conservatives Now See Deficits as a Tool to Fight
Spending, NY TIMES (Feb.11, 2003).
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406. See id.
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For a more detailed discussion, see CRS IBl 0110, DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH & DON C. RICHARDS
(COORDINATORS), MAJOR TAX ISSUES IN THE 108th CONG. (CRS updated Apr. 17, 2003).
408. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No, 108-27,115 Stat. 752.
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sales tax, stating that the tax system would result in a high tax rate, would be
difficult to administer, and would be burdensome on state taxing authorities.
The 2003 Bush Tax Cuts resulted in tax cuts of 0.3% of income for the bottom
20% of taxpayers and a 2.5% cut for middle-income taxpayers while the top 1% got
tax cuts twice as large at 5.4%. The top 0.1% saw their after-tax income increase by
6.2%.409 Estimates by economists Thomas Picketty and Emmanuel Saez conclude
that the average federal tax for the top 0.1% of households fell from 60% to 34%
from 1960 to 2004.41 These tax cuts, and the corresponding decrease in
progressivity of income taxes, resulted in dramatic growth in income and wealth
disparity.
At a hearing on Tax Fairness held by the House Committee on Ways and
Means, Leonard Burman, a Senior Fellow of the Tax Policy Institute made the
following points: income inequality has been rising since the mid-1980s and is now
approaching levels not seen since the Great Depression.411 The federal income tax
system mitigates economic inequality-and potentially at lower economic cost than
other alternatives, such as trade restrictions or labor market regulations-but the
recent tax cuts have disproportionately benefited those at the top, exacerbating the
trend in the disparity of pre-tax income.412 Further intensifying the inequality, the
income levels of these same high-income taxpayer households have increased. The
top 1% now earns 16% of all income-a level last seen just before the Great
Depression, and double the amount in the 1960s and 1970s.413 "However, even
while economic inequality has been approaching record levels, the tax cuts enacted
since 2001 have sharply reduced progressivity."414
These numbers validate one of the rationales behind the progressive income
tax, that the progressive income tax can be used to distribute or mitigate income or
wealth disparity. In this case, the Bush tax cuts have demonstrated that eliminating
the progressivity of the income tax can increase the amount of income inequality,
which was theorized by the economists who had publicly objected to President
Bush's 2003 Tax Proposal and it appears that they were correct.
Income inequality continues to grow.415 There have been gains in labor
productivity, but all of the benefits have gone to the 10% highest-income
individuals.416 All other income classes have seen their wages grow more slowly
409. See id.
410. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A
Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 13 (2007). Jason Bordoff and Jason Furmann,
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altogether and permitting any gains to be taxed at capital gains rates. See Meredith R. Conway, Stealth
Inequity: Using Corporate Integration to Ease Unfairness in the Tax Code, 2 WM. & MARY POL'Y REV. 53
(2010). See also Bordoff & Furman, supra note 25 at 335.
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414. See id. at 3.




than productivity. Some have attributed the increasing skew in earnings to "the
economics of superstars," which richly rewards the top performers relative to others
who are nearly as productive.4 17 The progressivity of the income tax has
dramatically decreased since the enactment of the Bush tax cuts from 2001 to
2009.418
'President Obama has repeatedly stated that he is supportive of a progressive
income tax and that he plans to enact tax rates consistent with a progressive income
tax. However, Obama did not revise the tax system during his first term because of
its potential impact on an unstable economy. Instead, when many of the tax cuts
enacted during the second Bush administration were set to expire, debates over the
appropriate amount of progressivity of the tax code and who should bear the burden
of the tax began. The continuation of certain tax cuts does continue to be a subject
of debate and is used by the Obama administration to further other policy goals
when needed. Therefore, the future of the progressivity of the tax code and the full
impact of the Bush tax cuts still remains to be seen and repercussions are still being
felt and discovered.
V. PREDICTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS TO DRAW FROM
THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
There are several predictions and conclusions that can be made as a result of
the analysis of the legislative history and the explanation of the six rationales for
the progressive income tax. After reviewing the substantial legislative and
secondary historical materials, there are certain trends developing in the recurring
debate over the progressive income tax and alternative proposals that can be
identified. In addition, this article uses testimony from two recent hearings, one
before the House Ways and Means Committee and one before the Senate Finance
Committee, to establish the relevance and necessity of the six fundamental
rationales for the progressive income tax.
A. The Current Progressivity ofour Income Tax
First, it is important to establish that the current income tax system is no longer
truly progressive. The United States currently has what is in reality, a flat tax with
smaller graduated rates for those who make less income. There is a flat tax rate for
those who make $250,000, $2.5 million, $25 million or $250 million, and there are
rate reductions for taxpayers who make $60,000 rather than $80,000. We
essentially have flat tax with a couple of rate breaks for lower-income taxpayers.
Once you add in employment taxes such as social security, which does not apply to
much of the income earned by high-income taxpayers, the income tax appears even
flatter. This flat tax trend is only further exacerbated by the 15% to 20% tax rate,
which is essentially a flat tax that currently exists on capital gains and dividends
and capital gains often make up most of the income of the wealthiest taxpayers. As
417. See id.
418. See Beverly Moran, Wealth Distribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L.J. 319, 325 (2010).
170 [Vol. 39:2
The Legislative Case for the Progressive Income Tax
noted by Chairman Senator Baucus, "capital gains make up 57 percent of the
adjusted gross income for the richest 400 taxpayers . .[which] helped these
extremely wealthy taxpayers, who had an average income of $345 million in
2007 ... to pay an average tax rate of only 17 percent."419
As Professor Daniel Shaviro recently testified during a Senate Finance
Committee, "A similar change in focus emerged during the 2010 debate concerning
extending the Bush tax cuts for people at the top of the income distribution. Many
on both sides of the debate argued that people at the very top were importantly
different from those earning only, say, $250,000. This change reflects widespread
public awareness of rising high-end income concentration, a trend in which there is
substantial academic consensus that does not depend on people's policy
preferences." 420
Some resemblance to a progressive income tax does remain. Most importantly,
the perception of the general public is that we still have a progressive income tax.
In addition, the basic structure still exists in the current law with the pretense of
graduated rates giving a lawmaker the ability to modify rates and the income levels
to which they apply to create more progressivity. But as of right now, following the
Bush Tax Cuts of 2001 and 2003, most of the progressivity in the income tax has
been eliminated and the United States is experiencing the consequences of that
decision.
B. Current Trends for Proposals for or Against the Progressive Income Tax
There are several trends in the debate surrounding the progressive income tax
and alternative proposals that have emerged after reviewing the substantial history
and supplementary materials. Since the Clinton Administration was in office, a
consistent theme has emerged in alternative conservative proposals. When
opponents to the progressive income tax make an alternative proposal, they attempt
to ascribe a progressive aspect to the proposal. Sometimes they will label the
proposal outright as progressive.
Perhaps this is because proponents of these alternative proposals believe that to
get public support for the bill, it must contain a progressive aspect. As a speaker
before a recent Senate Finance Committee noted, since World War I the
Progressive Income Tax, although attacked at times and repeatedly contending with
radical tax reforms, has remained the main source of revenue. The level of
progressiveness because of tax loopholes and expenditures as well as inflation has
threatened the degrees of progressivity but overall "the continuing progressiveness
of the federal tax system helped maintain middle and lower class support for it.
Most Americans still preferred the progressive income tax as the primary means of
federal finance."42' In addition, President Reagan's tax policies, "made it more
419. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 2 (2011).
420. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable? Hearing Before The Comm. on Fin.,
112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Daniel Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professors of Taxation, New York
University School of Law).
421. BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 216.
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difficult for critics of the income tax to make an appealing case for abandoning
it."422 As a result, it seems that opponents now claim that their plans are progressive
in some respect.
The progressive income tax is deeply ingrained in the American public and, in
general, the presumption of the public is that our tax system is progressive.
Therefore, when an alternative proposal is made, the proponent either just claims it
is somehow progressive, inserts a small provision with a progressive aspect to it so
they can claim that the bill is progressive, or they go through a deep and thorough
analysis with the goal at the end to somehow conclude that the proposal is
ultimately progressive, despite its appearance of being regressive.
For example, during the Clinton administration, Senator Arlen Specter tried to
make his proposal for a flat tax sound progressive by arguing that it would "force
many higher-income taxpayers to pay their fair share of taxes." 423 Representative
Dick Armey claimed his flat tax proposal was, "the definition of progressive."424
Others have argued that the tax is "already progressive enough" by looking at just
income taxes alone and excluding the impact on progressivity of any payroll or
425capital gain taxes.
A more recent example from 2011 is from the Fair Tax Act.426 The proponents
argued that a national sales tax with an effective tax rate of 23% on the
consumption of all goods and services was actually progressive. To make this
argument, they used math to call it progressive.427 The proponents had economists
determine whether the rates would be regressive or progressive. Because the rates
are clearly regressive (when applied in the current time), the economists decided to
determine if the tax would be regressive based on the tax rates one pays over his
entire lifetime.428 And as a result, these economists were able to conclude that the
Fair Tax was in fact a progressive tax by looking at the applicable lifetime tax
422. Id.
423. Flat Tax: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 104th Cong., 165 (1995) (statement of Hon.
Arlen Specter).
424. Flat Tax: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 104th Cong., 94 (1995) (statement of Rep. Dick
Armey).
425. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 131 (2011) (statement by the U.S Chamber of Commerce citing
statistics provided by the Tax Foundation).
426. Fair Tax Act of 2011, H.R. 25, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), http://www.opencongress.orgbill/1 12-
h25/text, S. 13, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
427. Tax Reform and Consumption-Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the Comm. On Ways and Means,
1l2th Cong., 8 (2011).
428. See Tax Reform and Consumption-Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the Comm. On Ways and
Means, 112th Cong., 13-22 (2011) (Testimony of Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Professor of Economics, Boston
University). For example, most infants do not pay taxes (or buy things) as with many senior citizens, so
averaging the lifetime tax rate of 30% (with an effective rate of 26%) by including theses periods, permitted
economists to conclude that over a lifetime, the Fair Tax would actually be progressive. Unfortunately the
plan did not include depositing one's lifetime savings in a bank account as well to be able to actually afford
the tax during the temporary "current periods" where it will be regressive, such as when you need to buy a car
and it would cost 26% more, or pay for college or daycare and it would cost 26% more.
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rates.429 The economist testifying at the hearing stated, "[Y]ou will see that this is
actually a highly progressive tax, and it does lower the taxes on working people."430
C. Recent Hearings Illustrate the Need for Understanding
the Rationales for the Progressive Tax
Because the Bush tax cuts were set to expire in 2012, there was significant
debate throughout 2011 and 2012 regarding where and how the tax burden should
fall. These debates continued to raise the six primary justifications for the
progressive income tax as a justification for and against a more progressive system.
In a September 2011 hearing on Tax-Reform Options in the Senate Finance
Committee, Chairman Baucus argued that the wealthier taxpayers should bear a
greater burden of the taxes because these taxpayers have a greater ability to pay.43
He argued that the Bush tax cuts should be permitted to expire with respect to the
highest income taxpayers because "[p]utting the full load of deficit reduction on
seniors, on veterans, and middle-class families, for example, when the wealthiest
can afford to pay more, simply does not make sense."432
Alternatively, Senator Orin Hatch stated that the momentum for asking the
wealthier to pay a greater amount of the tax was from "talking points from wealthy
liberals who seek to raise marginal rates . .. because they feel guilty that they are
not paying their fair share, I guess."433 Senator Hatch argues that rates should not be
raised because it would raise taxes on small businesses. He did not argue against the
ability-to-pay theory, but instead claimed that increasing tax rates on high-income
taxpayers would result in unfair burdens on small business owners rather than
targeting those with excess disposable incomes. For example, Senator Hatch says
President Obama is not "trafficking in economic reality and cutting to the effectual
truth for small businesses, if we raise marginal rates, the President talks about
raising rates on wealthy people like himself, because he has money he really does
not need."434
429. At the hearing Economist Professor Kotlikoff argued that the Fair Tax was actually more progressive
than the current income tax. He stated "Economists measure tax progressivity in terms of lifetime net tax
rates, specifically as the ratio of the present value of lifetime net tax payments divided by the present value of
lifetime resources (initial wealth plus the present value of future labor earnings). Politicians like to measure
tax progressivity in terms of current taxes divided by current income. But current income is not a useful
measure of a person or household's economic resources. Warren Buffett may have zero current income this
year if his capital losses are large enough to offset his capital gains, but his personal resources are immense."
See Tax Reform and Consumption-Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the Comm. On Ways and Means,
112th Cong., 19 (2011). (Testimony of Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Professor of Economics, Boston University)
430. Id.
431. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 1 (2011).
432. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 1 (2011).
433. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 2 (2011).
434. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 2 (2011).
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Many have again relied on several of the six justifications to emphasize the
need for a more progressive tax. In recent legislative hearings experts testified that
increasing tax rates on higher income taxpayers is necessary to redistribute the
wealth and to stop populist uprisings. In 2011 one expert testified before the Senate
Finance Committee that "[h]igher tax rates could mitigate economic inequality,
which has grown markedly over the past 30 years . .. the middle class has been in a
30-year recession. While top incomes have exploded, middle incomes have
stagnated." He further added, "[s]ome would like to raise taxes on low-income
households, but that would put an undue burden on working families struggling to
get by, and it would not raise as much revenue. Those people are poor." The same
expert in public policy suggested increasing tax rates would also preserve the
stability of the government arguing that, "the tax system plays an important role
and might forestall more costly populist responses to inequality, such as trade
restrictions, if we do not deal with the growing gap between rich and poor."435
In 2011 there were two hearings held on alternative tax proposals, one with the
House Ways and Means Committee and one before the Senate Finance Committee.
Both illustrate the need for the six rationales behind the progressive income tax and
how the rationales, without proper context, may come up in debate, but merely
confuse the discourse without giving any direction. It is helpful to pull some of the
relevant testimony out of the most recent hearings to demonstrate how the six
rationales intersect in the legislative debate, and to illustrate how now, with a better
foundational understanding of the rationales, more logical and purposeful
arguments can be made.
D. Ways and Means Committee Hearing, Hearing on Tax Reform and
Consumption-Based Tax Systems (July 26, 2011).436
This hearing focused on the Fair Tax Act (the plan described above where the
economist claimed it was actually a progressive tax plan). The testimony in this
hearing touched upon some of the six rationales identified in this article, but
because of a lack of historical references and analysis, the arguments were often
incomplete. With the analysis of the six rationales, policymakers and lawmakers
could more appropriately evaluate and debate whether a tax proposal was
appropriate.
For example, in response to the claims of the economist that the 23% effective
sales tax rate was actually progressive, several lawmakers made ability to pay
arguments and argued that the burden was not proportionate to a taxpayer's ability
to pay and reflected a disproportionate burden. Representative Bill Pascrell stated in
response to the economist, "Let's be clear. A national sales tax would be nothing
more, in my perception, than an enormous windfall for the very wealthy of this
country. Plain and simple, the wealthy do not spend as much as lower-income
435. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 14 (2011) (testimony of Dr. Leonard E. Burman, Professor of
Public Policy at Syracuse University).
436. See Tax Reform and Consumption-Based Tax Systems: Hearing Before the Comm. On Ways and
Means, I l2th Cong. (2011).
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families and the middle class. They just do not, as a percentage of their income." 437
Representative Black then argued along similar lines, "If you look at the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, you will see that people in the bottom quintile spend about
twice as much as their income. So the tax base that applies to consumption for
people with low income is going to be higher, precisely because a lot of those
people are the elderly who are drawing down saving."438
Representative Pascrell's argument was a representation of the ability to pay
theory and the concept that a taxpayer's tax burden should be proportionate to his
income level. Representative Black argued that the burden was also not
proportionate to their ability to pay and would fall disproportionately on the poorest
taxpayers, those below the poverty level and the elderly, who both generally spend
all of their income and have less available funds, less surplus of income, to pay the
tax.
E. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?
Hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate
A hearing was also held in 2011 in the Senate Finance Committee. It further
illustrates a Congressional debate where several of the six fundamental rationales
for a progressive income tax are raised.
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Max Baucus, began by
stating, "[A]n article by the Associated Press detailing this new study also revealed
a perception among average Americans that the wealthy do not pay their fair share.
The perception is that the tax loopholes and benefits that exist do not benefit
average Americans, and Americans do not know a lot about them." 439 He added,
"The 400 taxpayers with the highest adjusted gross incomes had an effective tax
rate of just below 17 percent for the 2007 tax year. The average income for those
taxpayers was $345 million per household. But the effective tax rate of folks
earning between $1 million and $1.5 million was much higher at 24 percent. How is
that possible? The U.S. has a fairly progressive income tax system. The tax brackets
rise with income. But we also must consider the tax incentives that affect a person's
tax liability and bring down tax rates. Two prime examples of this inequality are
deductions and exclusions.""o
Senator Baucus is illustrating two of the rationales presented by the legislative
history. The first is the rationale that the progressive tax system is not actually
progressive but is instead designed merely to give the impression that it is
progressive, while in reality it is filled with so many loopholes and targeted breaks
that the wealthy end up paying a lower rate of tax. The second rationale he
describes is the ability to pay theory and what is a taxpayer's appropriate burden.
437. Id. at 56.
438. Id. at 63.
439. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin.,
I 12th Cong., 1 (2011) (opening statement from Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman of the Sen. Fin. Comm.).
440. Id. at 2.
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The taxpayers in his example are all wealthy and would be able to pay the tax
imposed, but he is arguing that taxpayers who earn more should pay more.
Later, a discussion between Senator Baucus and Senator Orrin Hatch illustrates
the ability to pay concept and the common misconceptions that can surround it.
Senator Hatch states, "The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that
approximately 51 percent of all households, which includes filers and non-filers,
had either zero or a negative income tax liability for tax year 2009.""' Senator
Baucus then points out that the "Tax Policy Center estimates that 47 percent of
Americans did not pay income taxes in 2009. But that does not mean they did not
pay any taxes at all. Many of these same folks paid payroll taxes, and they paid
excise taxes. A large share of them are seniors, and many are families living in
poverty."442
This is a perfect example of the ability to pay concept and the appropriate tax
burdens for different levels of income. Originally, Senator Hatch objects to the
discovery that a majority of taxpayers are not paying any tax. Then Senator Baucus
clarifies that the percentages represent taxpayers who are either elderly and on a
fixed income with limited resources and therefore little surplus income, or they are
individuals living in poverty.
Senator Baucus then proceeds to give an example of the rationale of whether
the progressive income tax should be used to distribute income and/or wealth
among taxpayers. He also asks whether the growing disparity in income and wealth
is perhaps causing the growing lack of progressivity in the income tax.
Senate Baucus states, "The general perception of inequity in the tax code may
also stem from the fact that economic prosperity is not shared as widely as it once
was. Over the last 30 years, households with incomes in the highest 1 percent have
seen their before-tax income grow by 280 percent. But over the same period, 90
percent of Americans have seen essentially no increase at all.""' And "As we focus
on tax reform, we must ask whether our tax code has contributed to this disparity in
income growth. We should consider whether our tax system should take these
disparities into account in some way, and we must question whether our tax code
can better promote economic mobility and opportunity.""
Senator Baucus is debating the fundamental rationale of whether the
progressive income tax plays a role in distributing income and wealth and whether
it should. He also perceptively raises the possibility that the progressive income tax
(or decrease in the progressivity of the income tax) is contributing to the growing
inequality.
During the hearing, Professor Daniel Shaviro added to the issue of whether the
progressive income tax affects income inequality. He states in his testimony that he
does not believe the lack of progressivity is adding to rising inequality, but that the
income tax can be used to alleviate it. He reports, "The tax code is not a main
player in [the increase in income inequality] which is a lot of the demographics,
441. Id. at 4.
442. Id. at p. 2.
443. See id. at 2.
444. See id.
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technology, things like that. The tax code has contributed, though, in the sense that,
if there were higher rates that were effective-and that is, obviously, an important
question-then it could have ameliorated after- tax inequality."" 5 Professor Shaviro
also added "but I want to mention a lot of the story has to do with things like the
financial sector, and CEO compensation going up, and things like that. Salaries
have really been the big driver of rising high-end income inequality. The tax code
can ameliorate that. That is all we are talking about, not eliminating it, but
ameliorating it if there are slightly higher rates that are relatively effective."" 6
While Professor Shaviro does not believe that the progressive income tax (or
lack thereof) is creating the growing inequality in income, he posits that higher tax
rates under a progressive income tax could be used to alleviate the inequality and
help redistribute the income.
During the hearing Senator Orrin Hatch identifies one of the questions that this
paper seeks to address. "What this hearing is fundamentally about is whether the
tax code is a means of funding the basic and essential functions of a constitutional
republic or whether it is a means for a small elite to create their vision of a utopia. I
think the answers to these questions about the equitability of tax burdens and tax
benefits will become apparent once we actually determine the purpose of the
Federal tax code."
The six primary rationales for the progressive income tax have now been
identified and may clarify the answer to Senator Hatch's question. With that
information lawmakers and scholars can determine whether the six underlying
reasons for the progressive income tax are still relevant and how to address them.
V. CONCLUSION
The intent and scope of this paper does not include making broad policy
recommendations or evaluating the economic debate and evidence on an income tax
to propose a "best tax structure." Because of the lack of existing scholarship
establishing the reasons a progressive income tax was enacted and continued
through so many administrations, political parties and persuasions-policy makers
could not appropriately evaluate the consequences of a proposal affecting the
progressive income tax.
Instead, the intent of this paper is to lay out the six fundamental reasons we
have a progressive income tax. For better or worse, the American public is tied to a
progressive income tax, and in each legislative session, as more and more proposals
are introduced to eliminate or tinker with the progressive income tax, lawmakers
need to ask the critical question of why they are supporting or opposing a
progressive income tax, as well as what the consequences of that decision are.
The progressive tax does not exist merely for economic reasons; there are more
economically efficient systems, so no matter how economically sound a proposal is,
unless it fulfills additional needs served by a progressive income tax, it will not be
445. Id. at 15.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 5.
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an appropriate replacement. The progressive tax does not exist because it always
creates the fairest results, so coming up with a "more fair" proposal will not work if
the lawmakers making the proposal do not address the underlying issues behind the
progressive tax. Essentially, each of the six reasons, which have been repeatedly
readdressed throughout the legislative history, need to be evaluated before any
discussion surrounding keeping, repealing, amending, or revising the progressive
income tax can take place.
A. Applying the Factors
An analysis of the six foundational rationales in the current economic and
political climate demonstrates that all of them are still very relevant and need to be
essential considerations to any discussion about an appropriate tax structure.
(1) The Ability to Pay Theory - Recent statistics demonstrate that taxpayers
with higher incomes face lower tax burdens as a result of the tax cuts under
President Bush, including the reduction in the capital gains tax rate. Lower-income
taxpayers often now pay a greater tax rate than extremely wealthy high-income
taxpayers. Recent examples in the media include President Obama, who pays a
lower rate of tax than his secretary, and Warren Buffett, who pays a lower rate of
tax than his secretary as well. "One advantage of taxing capital gains in full is it
allows [the government] to lower tax rates on ordinary income, on small business
income, while maintaining the overall progressivity of the tax system."48 Another
current example was reflected in the protests of the "99%" against the "1%" in the
Occupy Movements and the arguments that the wealthiest 1% of taxpayers are not
paying their share of taxes.449
(2) To Preserve Democracy - Democracy has been threatened by the
concentration of wealth in the few who are able to control the airwaves and
advertising, special interest political groups formed by wealthy individuals and now
corporations following the Citizen United decision where wealth is concentrated
and can inappropriately influence both legislation and the political debate. 45 0
Allowing these groups the largest and loudest voices disenfranchises the ordinary
individual citizen from having his voice heard. All of these groups powerfully
influence our legislators, legislative policy, and dominate and control the political
discourse. The inequality of wealth is creating the very power instabilities that the
448. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 23 (2011) (testimony of Dr. Leonard E. Burman, Professor of
Public Policy at Syracuse University).
449. See Cornel West on Occupy Wallstreet: It's the Makings of a U.S. Autumn Responding to the Arab
Spring, DEMOCRACY NOW!. (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2011/9/29/comel-west-on-occupy-wallstreet-itsjthe-makings-of a_u
sautumnrespondingto-the arab-spring;
Katrina vanden Heuvel, Will Occupy Wall Street's Spark Reshape our Politics? THE WASH POST (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-occupy-wall-streets-spark-reshape-our-
politics/201 1/10/10/glQArPJjcL.story.html.
450. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S 310.(2010); Sheelah Kolhatkar, How Karl
Rove's Super PAC Plays the Senate BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 4 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-04/exclusive-how-karl-roves-super-pac-plays-the-senate.
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founders were concerned about and is a threat to our democracy and a government
for the people, of the people and by the people.
(3) To Prevent Socialism, Communism, Anarchy or Revolution - The constant
protests throughout the country under the Occupy Movement have clearly
illustrated that the progressive income tax (or the lack of one) is threatening the
stability of our government. The very premise of the 99% versus the 1% argument
is how income and wealth is distributed and who bears what burdens. The tax
system is not adequately addressing this issue and is resulting in demonstrations
and riots, some specifically designed to interfere with business and the
government. 451 As one expert testified, "[i]f the bottom 60 or 80 percent of the
population feels like they're not getting their fair share, that could lead to a populist
revolt." Therefore "those who benefit most from the current system have an
incentive-completely beyond any notion of altruism- to try to mitigate extreme
inequality in ways that entail less economic cost." 452
(4) The Benefit Theory - It is unclear who is receiving the benefits of
government. While it is only a matter of perception, it appears that taxpayers at
either end of the income spectrum, the wealthiest and the poorest receive the most
in government benefits, while the tax burden falls the heaviest on the middle class.
The middle class goals of good schools, opportunities for college, secure jobs, and
financial stability are not benefits currently being provided by the government.
(5) There is an illusion of a progressive tax to appease the public while really
doing favors for special interests - the statements made and statistics cited by
Senator Max Baucus above and recent polls clearly demonstrate that the perception
of the American public is that the tax system is not truly progressive, that high-
income taxpayers have a lower tax burden than middle7-income and low-income
taxpayers, and that there are many tax breaks designed just for the wealthy. 453 The
progressivity of the tax has dramatically decreased since the Bush tax cuts of 2001-
2009.454
(6) Using the Progressive Income Tax to Redistribute Income or Wealth - The
disparity and inequality of income and wealth is at its greatest levels since the Great
Depression and the growth in disparity correlates with the same time period that
progressivity began to erode from the income tax. Income and wealth disparity has
451. See Cornel West on Occupy Wallstreet: It's the Makings ofa U.S. Autumn Responding to the Arab
Spring, DEMOCRACY Now!. (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2011/9/29/comelwest-onoccupy_wall-street_itsthe.-makings.of au
s_autumnjresponding_to_the _arabspring;
Katrina vanden Heuvel, Will Occupy Wall Street's Spark Reshape our Politics? THE WASH POST (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-occupy-wall-streets-spark-reshape-our-
politics/20 11/10/1 0/glQArPJjcLstory.html.
452. See Tax Reform Options: Marginal Rates on High-Income Taxpayers, Capital Gains, and Dividends:
Hearing Before the Sen. Finance Committee 45 (2011) (written statement of Dr. Leonard E. Burman,
Professor of Public Policy at Syracuse University).
453. Is The Distribution Of Tax Burdens And Tax Benefits Equitable?: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin.,
112th Cong., 1-3 (2011) (opening statement from Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman of the Sen. Fin. Comm.); Rep.
Chaka Fattah, Policy Essay: D4jd vu All Over Again: Reexamining Fundamental Tax Reform and Evaluating
the Feasibility of a Transaction Tax in the I11 Congress, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 332 (2010).
454. See Beverly Moran, Wealth Distribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L.J. 319, 325 (2010).
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been increasing since the mid-1980s, which corresponds to when the Reagan tax
breaks began to take effect and reduce the amount of progressivity in the income
tax.45
Now that the six rationales used throughout the legislative history of the
progressive income tax have been established, and it has been confirmed that they
are still very much relevant today. Legislators, analysts, and policymakers can
finally base their analysis and proposals on the central principles upon which the
progressive income tax was based.
455. See Burman, supra note 44, at 4.
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